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TOWARDS AN/OTHER LEGAL EDUCATION: 
SOME CRITICAL AND TENTATIVE PROPOSALS 
TO CONFRONT THE RACISM OF MODERN LEGAL 
EDUCATION 
Richard F. Devlin* 
... the Queen wishes her red children to learn the cunning of the 
white man ... 
The Honourable Alexander Morris, Lieutenant 
Governor of Manitoba, The Northwest Terri­
tories and Kee-Wah-Tin1 
I. Prefatory Comments 
It seems to me that by drawing on the myth of Prometheus, Harry Arthurs 
has struck an important chord that we may find will resonate throughout the 
papers that are to be presented today. Particularly, by emphasizing the idea of 
being "unbound," President Arthurs has opened up a conversation that is 
premised upon the connection between law and freedom. I propose to take up 
and expand that conversation and, hopefully, to give it a significantly different 
orientation. Specifically, I want to identify and attempt to come to terms with an 
issue which, I fear, does not engender sufficient concern within the legal com­
munity: the manner in which contemporary university legal education per­
petuates and reinforces "the culture of silence,"2 and, more generally, the way in 
which Canadian society seems unwilling to acknowledge the pervasiveness of 
racism. To substantiate these propositions it will be necessary for me to oscillate 
between theoretical reflection on the one hand, and practical suggestions on the 
other. My presentation will be structured as follows:· Part II is a reflection on the 
nature and ramifications of the historical context in which we currently find our­
selves, what I broadly identify as "modernity." The third part of my paper devel­
ops, briefly, a critique of contemporary university legal education. Part IV con­
nects this critique with what can be· described as the existential malaise of 
modernity and tentatively develops an alternative, reconstructive vision. Part V 
concretizes this vision through some tentative proposals that are designed to con­
front the structural racism of contemporary legal education in Canada. In Part 
VI, I will return to the theme of sameness and difference, while Part VII 
demonstrates that reconstruction is not unprecedented, even for law . 
• 
Faculty or Law, University or Calgaiy. Special thanks to Hany Arthurs, Alexandra Dobrowolsky, David Howes, 
Karen Johnston, Sheila McIntyre, Wayne MacKay, Wade Macl..auchlan, Leon Tralunan and Mary Ellen Turpel 
each of whom provided helpful criticism on earlier versions orth.is article. Any infelicities that remain are my own. 
Tb.is is for J.M 
1 Alexander Morris, The Treaties of CDIUlda with The Indians of Manitoba and the Nonh-West Tenitories (f oronto: 
Belfords, 1975) at 96. Cited in NOlive Lawyers: Why So Few? Report or the Special Students Committee, Faculty 
of Law, University of Manitoba, 1984 at 16. 
2See generally, Paulo Freire, The Politics of Education (South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and GaJVey,1985). 
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One final introductory comment. I believe that we should always be careful 
about the language we adopt, that accusations should not be wantonly bandied 
about, and that there is a thin line between use and abuse. Undoubtedly, some 
may be uncomfortable with my suggestion that contemporary Canadian legal edu­
cation incorporates racist norms or practices. Frequently such discomfort 
manifests itself in the demand, "what do you mean by 'racism"'? I want to resist 
providing a definition of racism because I believe that definitions are as constrain­
ing as they are helpful, and that more often than not they take on a life and 
dynamic of their own that becomes a distraction from the concern that they are 
designed to identify. With that proviso in mind, it may be useful to provide an in­
terpretive angle that can lay the parameters for the remainder of this article. I 
understand racism through the prisms of power and inequality. As a 
phenomenon, racism can be conceived of as a conscious or unconscious, personal 
or institutional, belief, ideology or practice that, in response to a person or 
group's racial origins, has as its purpose or effect, the cultural or economic sub­
ordination/ exclusion of that person or group.3 One thesis of this article is that 
one reason why there are so few indigenous lawyers is because of the racist un­
derpinnings of modern legal education. A second thesis is that this situation can 
31 base this interpretation on what Indigeno� and Black people have told me about their experiences with, and 
feelin� towards, Canadian society. As Dr. Carrie Best informed the Marshall Inquiiy on November 25, 1988, " ... 
racism is as common as Hockey Night in Canada." The following provide alternative interpretations, although 
each, like my own, bas its own perspective: 
(a) "racial prejudice + institutional power = racism." 
Esmeralda Thornhill, Presentation To the Marshall Inquiiy, 25 November, 1988. 
(b) "racism is the doctrine that a man's (sic) behaviour is determined by stable inherited characteristics deriving 
from separate racial stocks, having distinctive attributes and �ually considered.to stand to one another in relations 
of superiority and inferiority." 
Michael Banton, "The Concept Of Racism" in S. Zubaida (ed) Race and Racialism (London: Tavistock Publica-
tions, 1970) at 18. 
' 
(c) "A working definition of white racism: racism is a lie. The lie asserts that white people (people of European an-
cestiy) are innately superior morally, intellectually, and culturally to other racial/cultural groups." 
Teriy Wolverton, "Unlearning Complicity, Remembering Resistance: White Women's Anti-Racism Education" in 
Charlotte Bunch, Sandra Pollack Le.oming Our Way (Trumansburg, N.Y.: Crossing Press, 1983). Wolverton con­
tinues: 
Eveiyone born into a racist society learns this misinformation. We do not ask to learn it; we often 
resist learning it. Once we learn this lie, we perpetuate it through creating or participating in institu­
tions which legislate privilege to white people. These institutions bestow economic, legal, political, ed­
ucational and social power to white people, while robbing people of color of their labor, natural 
resources, cultures, and right to self determination. Eliminating racism involves exposing and unlearn­
ing the lie, and dismantling the institutions which keep the lie iri tact Ibid. 
For extended analyses and critiques of Canada's racist norms and practices see Subbas Ramcharan, 
Racism: Nonwhites in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); B. Singh Bolaria and Peter S. Li, Racial Oppression 
in Canada (Toronto: Geramond Press, 1985). See also Charles R. Lawrence III, "The Id, The Ego, and Equal 
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism" (1987) 39 Stanford Law Rev. 317; Joe Feagin and Clairecc 
Feagin, Discrimination American Style: Institutwnol Racism and Sexism (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 
1978). 
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only be remedied if we develop an alternative, post-liberal ethos, one that neces­
sitates and justifies the adoption of a "preferential option for the poor and the op­
pressed." 
II. Some Thoughts On Modernity 
Our culture treats differences as something to be afraid of, 
something to distrust. Look at the myths about Black people, 
the myths about homosexuals, the myths about women. All in­
volve terror and distrust of someone who is different from the 
dominant norm--the other. 
Education involves breaking down those fears. It's not just 
providing information about the inequality of women or the in­
equality of Blacks. It's not just letting people know that some 
people get a bad deal. It's also speaking to that fear of dif­
ference, that absolutely irrational and yet deeply imbedded ter­
r0r of the other in our society. Fear, insecurity, and hierarchy 
are so entrenched that if someone is different from you, im­
mediately there is a need to rank them as better or worse; to 
worry that they're going to get you; or that there's something 
very terrifying about their lifestyle. If we could learn from dif­
ferences to see that they make life interesting, then those dif­
ferences would open us all up .for greater possibilities. 
Charlotte Bunch4 
We live in a modern world and modernity is the pervasive intellectual world 
view. Generally, modernity with its emphasis on mutability and prospectivity--can 
be understood in contradistinction to antiquity--with its emphasis on classicism 
and foundationalism, and medievalism with its emphasis on status and hierarchy. 
To focus, but without attempting to define its essence, I want to suggest that 
modernity can be understood from two, interconnected perspectives. The first is 
technical-economic, while the second is politico-philosophical and aesthetic.5 As 
4Charlotte Bunch, in "Bunch and Powell Talk About Feminism, Blacks and Education as Politics" in C. Bunch 
and Sandra Pollack, (eds.) Leaming our Way (Trumansburg. N.Y.: Cr06Sing Press, 1983), 302 at 310-311. See also 
Audre I..orde, Sister OU/sider (1984). 
1'0 attempt to provide a determinative definition of modernism would be �ible, indeed, anti-thetical to its 
significance. However, one commentator suggests that some of its key themes include, but are not limited by "an 
intense concern with the mediation of 'content' by form; use of synchronous montage as an alternative to merely 
linear additive time; techniques of 'de-familiarizing' the object-world; cultivation of pa,adox and ambiguity as op· 
posed to monolithic notions of a single objective reality; and exploration of the fragmented and alienated experi­
ence of individuals in modem urban and industrial societies." Eugene Lunn, Marxism and Modemism 2 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press,1982). For some useful discussions of modernity see Richard Bernstein (ed) 
Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985); J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discoune of 
Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987); Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New 
York: Basic Books, 1976); Frederick R. Kar� Modernism and Moderism (New York: Atbeneum Press,1985); Mal­
colm Bradbwy and James McFarlane (eds), Modernism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976); Marsball Berman, All 
Thal Solid Melts /1110 Air (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982); S. Spender, The Struggle of the Modem (London: 
R Hamilton, 1963); Jo Anna Isaac, The Ruin of Representation and Modem Art and Texts (Ann Arbor, Mich.: 
' 
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Max Weber reminds us, modernity has a peculiar and particular connection with 
the emergence of western society.6 Specifically, it is connected with the West's 
phenomenal and unique economic growth in the nineteenth century, supple­
mented since then by "continuous technological innovation .. . expanded industri­
alization and urbanization."7 This is reflected in Weber's concept of 
"rationalization," or what elsewhere has been described as "the rational­
scientific"8 or "instrumental rationality.'
,
9 In its politico-philosophic and aesthetic 
moment, which can be traced to an epoch prior to the industrial revolution,10 
modernity is characterized by what Seyla Benhabib describes as "self-reflexivity," 
an awareness of the partiality, incompleteness and contingency of any worldview, 
including modernity's own.11 By embracing transience, fluidity and openness 
modernity comprehends reality as "becoming rather than being,"1
2 as a dynamic 
"not yet" rather than a static "that's it." Understood in this light, modernity is 
neither essentially good nor bad, neither necessarily desirable nor undesirable. 
Historically, however, it has engendered two contradictory responses, one nega­
tive, the other affirmative. 
The negative response to modernity has been underpinned by an anxious fear 
of nihilism, the concern that the abandonment of certainty leaves us in a 
meaningless vacuum, thereby rendering all our efforts--personal, political or 
pedagogical--futile. The result, then, has been disillusionment and disenchant­
ment. This has also gone in two directions. In its liberal manifestations, this loss 
of stability has resulted in the "triumph" of the individual subject, and the as­
cendancy of moral relativism. In turn, these premises have contributed to a belief 
that the only process that makes existential sense is to priorize one's own needs 
or desires. By the late twentieth century this has resulted in the cult of the self 
where apathy, narcissism and consumerism become the determinants of human 
existence. The other negative approach that has been adopted has been, at bot­
tom, reactionary. This has been the effort to identify modernity as the cause of 
U.M.I. Research Press, 1986). 
For discussions and examples of its _impact on contemporary jurisprudence, see e.g. David Luban, "Legal 
Modernism," (1986) 84 Michigan LR.; Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free 
Press, 1975); Passwn.: An Essay on Human Personality (New York: Free Press, 1984); Politics (Cambridge, M�.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987); D. Cornell, "Towards a Modem/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics," 133 
U.Pa.L.R. 295 (1985). For a further critical discussion of modernism, see my review essay of Unger's Politics, "On 
the Road to Radical Reform" 27 Osgoode Hall LJ. (fo�hcoming). 
6Max Weber, Economy and Society eds 0. Roth and C. Wittich (New York: Bedminister Press, 1968). The 
Protestanl Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism trans. Talcott Parsons (London: 0. Allen & Unwin, 1930). 
7
Seyla Benbabib, "Autonomy, Modernity and Community: An Exchange Between Communitarianism and Criti­
cal Social Theory" [unpublished). 
8Fraoklln Baumer, Modem European Tlwughl (New York: MacMillan, 1977) at 268,369. 
9Max Horkbeimer and Theodor Adorno, The Dialecn'c of the Enlighlerunent. (New York: Seaburg Press, 1972) 
10See generally, Franklin Baumer, Modem European Tlwughl (New York: MacMillan, 1977) and Frederick R.Karl 
Modem and Mode'!!}sm (New York: Atheneum, 1985). 
11Benbabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) at 257-258. 
12&umer supra, note 8 passim. 
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our ills, and to hark back to a premodern era in a quest for stability. This is an at­
tempt to backtrack on the democratizing elements and potential of modernity, an 
attempt to reinstitutionalize elitism.13 
The affirmative response is to recognize the emancipatory potential of 
modernity, to embrace its resistance to closure, and to direct its context­
dislocating impulse14 in humanizing directions. Specifically, modernity recognizes 
a role for human agency, be it benign or malign, although it would reject naive 
voluntarism. In this sense, modernity is empowering in that it reaffirms the con­
structive, reconstructive, and destructive potential of humanity and locates re­
sponsibility for the direction of contemporary society on human agency. Con­
sequently, it provides us with a vital opportunity to challenge those who claim that 
social conditions as currently constructed are "necessary," "inevitable," the 
"natural order of things," on the basis that this order is constructed and that 
some are benefactors and others are disadvantaged. In relation to racism, then, 
modernity allows us to challenge the still pervasive and deeply embedded es­
sentialist assumption that our qualities, abilities and potentials as persons are de­
pendent upon our. racial origins. Moreover, because of its anti-essentialist bent, 
modernity directs our attention to alternative non-biologically determined expla­
nations for racial inequality; for example, that the differences between races are 
utilized by some as a legitimation of their oppression and inferiorization of 
others.15 Thus, modernity emphasizes the centrality of power relations, it 
highlights factors of reinforcement, and indicates centres of resistance. Most im­
portantly, it identifies the constructed nature of power itself, its mutability, its 
transience. In this affirmative light, modernity suggests that things do not neces­
sarily fall apart, rather they might fall together, thereby encouraging us to pursue 
a politics of hope. 
III. Critique 
Whether [it] is done ingenuously or astutely, separating educa­
tion from politics is not only artificial but dangerous. 
Paulo Freire 
Critical legal studies, as a movement of thought and action in law, both 
denunciates and annunciates. Those who inhabit the mainstream of the legal 
13Recent educational debates mirror this negative dual dynamic. For example, a deconstructive reading of Derek 
Bok's liberal and widely celebrated Higher Leaming (1986) suggests that his primaJy concern is not the improve­
ment of third level education in its own right, but rather because he identifies education as an essential bulwark to 
resist the decline of the American empire, brought about by the emergence of competitors. See for example, p.5. 
The reactionary element bas manifested itself in the diatn'bes of Allan Bloom, "The Failure of the University" 
(1974) Daedalus 60; The CkJsing of the American Mind (1987); E.D. Hirsch, Cultural UlerOcy (1987)and Linda 
Frum, Unda Frum's Guide to Canadian Universities (1987). See also Michael Levin, "Women's Studies, Ersatz 
Scholarship" (198.5) 17 New Perspectives 7. 
14Roberto Mangabeira Unger, False Necessity (Cambridge: Cambridge University �. 1987). 
150ne wonders why Bloom is so critical of, for example, Black Studies, supra, note 13. 
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community--be they practitioners or academics--if they have heard of critical legal 
studies at all, have probably focused their attention on the denunciatory aspects 
of our activities ... and with good reason: for it is they whom we hold responsible 
in large part for the impoverished nature of our legal system.16 However, critique 
is only one side of the progressive coin, for we also advocate reconstruction. And 
it is to the project of reconstruction of the legal academy that I want to address 
the vast majority of this paper. Nevertheless, for the sake of comprehensiveness 
it may be useful to briefly highlight some of the aspects of the critique of 
mainstream legal education. 
The critique of mainstream legal education operates on at least three levels: 
whom we teach, what we teach, and how we teach. Even the most cursory review 
of the constituencies, "texts," and methodologies of university legal education in 
Canada betrays the political agenda, be it explicit or hidden, conscious or uncon­
scious, intentional or systemic. 
The question of whom we teach is important in that, by identifying the pri­
mary recipients of this "community service," it directly unravels the much vaunted 
neutrality and objectivity of the legal community. Only an ostrich would think 
that, for example, social, economic, racial or gendered factors have no relevance 
for the viewpoint of the legal community.17 The simple fact is that the consumers 
of legal education are still primarily upper or middle class. Even Law and Leam­
ing, hardly a CCLS manifesto, recognizes the class bias of recruitment to law 
school: 
... the law student population in the 1980's probably resembles that of the 1950's 
in a socio-economic sense: it remains heavily skewed toward children of middle 
class and professional families .. . law study and law practice are effectively 
beyond the reach of many able but disadvantaged individuals.18 
This has been particularly obvious to. me as a non-Canadian, legally educated 
elsewhere. Although I would be reluctant to wax eloquent about legal education 
in Northern Ireland (for it cannot be done), on an impressionistic basis I would 
suggest that between one-third and one-half of my classmates would have been 
16rrus is not to be taken as an indirect claim that critical legal scholars, themselves a privileged constituency, are 
beyond criticism. See in particular "The Minority Critiques of The Critical Legal Studies Movement," (1987) 22 
Harvard C.R.-C.LL Rev. 297-447. Much of this present paper is inspired by that critique. 
171rus juridical pretension to neutrality and impartiality is symptomatic of a deeper malaise than either self delu• 
sioo or ideologk:al obfuscation, although it is tbo&e also. It is connected to at least one strand of bberalism, what 
philosophers call "Deootologk:al liberalism." John Rawls, whose Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1970) I consider to be the most developed, honest and comprehensive of all con­
temporary bberal thinkers, in bis pursuit of "the right" debberately takes as bis primaty task the philosophical 
elimination of difference, the factoring out of just those characteristics that make us who we are. At bottom, be UD· 
derstands difference to be a cognate of bias, whereas, as will become clear, I understand it to be fundamental to 
our humanity. 
18Law and Leaming: A Report to tlu! S.S.H.RC. (Ottawa: The Council, 1983) fChair.: Hany Arthurs; hereinafter 
the Artlwn Repon.) See also Hany Glasbeek and Reuben Hasson "Some Reflections on Canadian Legal E.duca­
tion" (1987) 50 Modem Law Review m. 
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from a working-class background, and many of these would have been from the 
"ghettoes. " This had an impact on the students far beyond the obvious political 
ramifications of Ireland. The point here, however, is that the pervasiveness of 
sameness in Canadian law schools is quantitatively different than it is, for exam­
ple, in Northern Ireland. 
Class is only one factor in the critique of the predominantly unidimensional 
character of those who currently have access to university legal education.19 
Despite developments over the last two decades, women still comprise less than 
haH of the contemporary law school population.20 Although law schools are begin­
ning to respond to the demands for access by various ethnic groups--Ukrainian, 
Jewish and Italian for example--other ethnic communities are still almost com­
pletely excluded, most disturbingly, Indigenous Peoples and Blacks. The paucity 
of minority participation indicates to me that--implicitly if not explicitly--racist 
norms still inform Canadian legal education. I will return to this point below. 
What we teach is also important. As will become apparent, an organizing 
theme for this paper is relationship · between sameness and difference. As Harry 
Arthurs has pointed out elsewhere, both legal education and legal practice fulfill 
19This statement should not be misunderstood. Sameness and difference are relative, not absolute concepts. Of 
course, each member of the legal educational community is different from the others and it is these di1Ierences 
that make even the contemponuy educational process enjoyable. Nevertheless, it is still fair and accurate to sug­
gest that the majority of the participants are more like each other than they are like those who are excluded. 
20Current statistics indicate that women compose something in the region of 45 percent of the law student popula­
tion. The following is a profile of the first year class broken down by gender: 
� � � 
!: M !: M !: M 
University of Victoria 41 62 44 55 43 53 
University of British Columbia 102 U6 109 125 U2 113 
University of Calgaiy 27 33 36 30 38 28 
University of Alberta 80 95 65 106 76 107 
University of Saskatchewan 38 75 48 66 37 73 
University of Manitoba 39 53 40 52 40 54 
University of Windsor 69 75 61 76 58 75 
University of Western Ontario 51 104 67 88 64 93 
Osgoode Hall Law School N/R N/R 158 167 159 166 
University of Toronto 55 105 79 95 74 105 
Queen's Univemity 61 90 65 84 62 94 
University of Ottawa (Common Law) 72 86 76 89 81 89 
McGill University 25 25 16 31 27 27 
University of New Brunswick 30 51 32 50 34 48 
Dalhousie University fil 2Q 62 � I! � 
TOTAL 757 1070 958 U09 986 UlO 
Approx %  41% 59% 44% 56% 45% 55% 
There are some indications that the civ il law schools appear to do better. 
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powerful ideological and socializing roles.21 Last night he described this as the 
"professional nexus." It seems to me that there is something insidious about a 
practice that superficially appears to accept difference but, in the course of its 
processes, eradicates the significance of difference. Restated, although law 
schools, in pursuit of the open door, may accept some students from culturally 
different backgrounds, by their subject matter and norms, law schools demand 
that, in order to succeed, these students become different from what they are, in 
other words, that they become the same as the others. What we teach plays an 
important role in forging this transformation, this eradication and elimination of 
difference. Consider, for example, the facial neutrality of the vast majority of the 
courses we teach and the materials we assign. They are premised almost exclu­
sively upon a colour blind, generic "he," thereby rendering invisible the specificity 
of difference. The message that goes across loud and clear from a law school cur­
riculum is that the real law, the important law, is that which dovetails with the op­
erational requirements of westernized, capitalist post-industrial, patriarchal 
society. Other topics or approaches, those which are seen as different, are un­
derstood to be "soft," as deviant, as "perspectives" from without, as "law and . . .  
'' courses, not the real. thing, not fundamental to the real world of law. 
Closely interconnected with the question of what is the question of how we 
teach and the messages that are encoded therein. Critical scholars are painfully 
aware that knowledge and power are fundamentally interconnected, and that 
knowledge itself is a key factor in the continuation or transcendence of the rela­
tions of domination and subordination that characterize contemporary society. 
More particularly, we are concerned about the power-laden nature of the 
professor-student relationship, the patron-client dynamic that not infrequently 
results in deference, dependency and disempowerment, and the abuse of il­
legiti(n)mate hierarchy. We are concerned about the psychically repressive 
aspects of domination, the way in which education can internalize and sediment 
the patterns of domination and subordination in the subconscious of the per­
sonality by making hierarchy and estrangement appear to be the natural and in­
evitable order. The basic proposition is that, as a central component in the train­
ing, controlling and disciplining of students, legal education plays a vital role in 
molding some of the key technicians of what Michel Foucault calls the 
"disciplinary society."
22 Legal education, in this view, is about power (sameness) 
and powerlessness (difference), a microcosm not only of domination and sub­
ordination but also of one of the means of their reproduction.zi 
21See eg Arthurs et al.''The CanadiaD Legal Profession" (1986) AB.F. ResJ. 447 at 496-500; Arthurs, "The Law 
School in a University Setting" in R. Mat& and D. McCawley, eds., Legal Education in Canada (Montreal: Feder-
ation of Law Societies of Canada, 1987) 157. 
�chel Foucault, Discipline and Punish. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977) 
23.rbere is a rapidly burgeoning critical and feminist literature on the politics of legal education. See e.g. Sheila 
McIntyre and Mary O'Brien, "Patriarchal Hegemony and Legal Education" (1987) 2 CJ.W.L. 69; Mary Joe Frug. 
"Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook" (1985) 34 Am. U.L.R. 1065; James R. 
Elkins (ed.), "Worlds of Silence: Women the Law School" (1984) 8 ALSA F. 1; K.C. Worden, "Overshooting the 
Target: A Feminist Deconstruction of Legal Education" (1985) 34 Am. U.L.R. 1141; Jennifer Jan; "Frame­
Shifting: An Empowering Methodology for Teaching and Learning Legal Reasoning" (1986) 35 J. Legal Educa­
tion 249 at 258-261; Nancy S. Erickson, "Legal Education: The Last Academic Bastion of Sex Bias?" (1986) 10 
Nova LI. �7; Faith Seidenberg. "A Neglected Minority--Women Law School" (1986) 10 Nova LJ. 843. Elizabeth 
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IV. Preferential Option 
. . .  critical social theory frames its research program and its 
conceptual framework with an eye to the aims and activities of 
those oppositional social movements with which it has a partisan 
though not uncritical identification. 
Nancy Fraser24 
The foregoing critique of mainstream legal education, though necessary and 
beneficial, is insufficient in that it lacks an articulated reconstructive vision. More­
over, because it is a critique, it still concedes too much, allowing the dominant 
tradition to continue to set the agenda, both substantively and methodologically. 
Finally, as a matter of realpolitik and inspirational motivation, it cannot be ex­
pected that people will abandon the present system, even if they acknowledge its 
failings, unless they have a developed sense of how things could be "otherwise." 
What is required is a situated discourse that both responds to the needs of the 
times and makes concrete reconstructive proposals. This section lays a founda­
tion for "another" legal educational system, while the following section will tenta­
tively outline how it might begin to operate in practice. 
As I indicated earlier, one of the key aspects of modernity is contingency, the 
awareness that essentialism is a fraud, the conviction that reality is constructed to 
its core. 25 A consciousness of contingency may manifest itself in one of two 
M Schneider, "Task Force Reports on Women in the Courts: The Challenge for Legal Education" (1988) 38 J. 
Legal Education 87; Nancy S. Erikson, "Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some Common l�ues" (1988) 101 J. of 
Legal Education; Ann Sballeck, "Report of the Women and the Law Project: Gender Bias and the Law School 
Curriculum" (1988) 38 J. Legal Education 87; Mal)' Irene Coomes, "Crime in the Stacks, or a Tale of a Text: A 
Feminist Response to a Criminal Law Textbook" (1988) 38 J. Legal Education 117 (1988); Taunya Lovell Banks, 
"Gender Bias in the Classroom" (1988) 38 J. Legal Education 137. Karl Klare, "The Law School Curriculum in 
the 1980's: What's Left?" (1982) 32 J. Legal Education 336; Morton Horowitz, "Are Law Schools Fifty Years Out 
of Date?" (1985/1986) 54 U.M.K.C.L.R 385; Elizabeth Mensch, "History of Mainstream Legal Thought" in D. 
Kailys, The Politics of Law (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982) at 18; Peter Gabel and Jay Feinman, "Contract 
Law as Ideology" in Kailys ibid. at 172; Richard Abe� ''Torts," Ibid. at 185; Robert Kerry Wi.1.kim, "The Person 
You are Supposed to Become: The Politics of the Law School Experience" (1987) 45 U. of T. Fac.LRev. 98. 
Stephen Halpern, "The Politics and Pathology of Legal Education" (1982) 32 Journal of Legal Education 383. 
GA.H. Benjamin et al., "The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students 
and Lawyers" (1986) A.B.F. Res. J. 225; Toni Pickard, "Experience as Teacher: Discovering The Politics of Law 
Teaching" (1983) 33 U. ofT. LI. 279; "Is Real Life Finally Happening?" (1986) 2 CJ.W.L 150; Duncan Kennedy, 
Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierwrhy: A Polemk Against the System (Cambridge, Mass.: Afar, 1983); 
"Liberal Values in Legal Education" (1986) 10 Nova LI. 603; J.C. Foster, "1be 'Cooling Out' of Law Students" 
(1981) 3 Law and Policy Q. 243: Carrie Menke! Meadow, "Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and 
Legal Education or The Fem-Crits Go to Law School" (1988) 38 Journal Legal Education 61. 
Critical legal scholars do not pretend to be original in their analysis of education. Rather theirs is an application 
of what is more generally identified as, "1be New Sociology of Education." See also, Jerry Farber, The StudenJ as 
Nigger (New York: Pocket Books, 1969. 
24Nancy Fraser, "What's Critical about Critical Theory" in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds.) Feminism 
as Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) at 31. 
25R.M. Unger, Politics: A Worlc in Constructive Social Theory (3 Vols.) (1987). 
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responses: trepidation and the politics of fear; or, therapy and the politics of 
hope. I subscribe to the latter. 
Liberalism, itself a catalyst for modernity, has taken us a long way. Its em­
phasis on equality and its rejection of status and entrenched hierarchy provide an 
important precedent for the potential of democracy, participation and empower­
ment. But we are not yet "there." The liberal commitment to substantive equality 
and real freedom has stalled midstream, failing to interrogate what I consider to 
be the fundamental dilemma of postindustrial, patriarchal society: that the free­
dom of some is dependent upon the oppression of others.26 To be context­
specific, the comfort and wealth of mainstream, upper and middle-class Canada is 
premised upon a history and contemporary practice of exploitation and sub­
ordination. Witness, for example, our racism, past and present, towards In­
digenous Peoples, Acadians, Blacks, various ethnic groups or the second class 
status assigned to many women. 
In part, liberalism's failure to deal with the paradox of freedom founded on 
domination may be due to the extremism of its reaction against the feudalistic 
system of status. Undoubtedly, the regime of status produced a social structure 
that was hierarchical, exploitative and dehumanizing but it did have a sense inter­
dependence and community, impoverished though they might have been. In its 
quest for equality, liberalism priorized the dignity of the self in order to challenge 
the inequality of a feudalistic community, but in so doing set in motion a dynamic 
that has resulted in a decidedly anticommunitarian ideology that bifurcates the 
self and the other. The result has been individualism taken to an extreme so that 
we fail to recognize the importance of others to our very existence and identities, 
what some philosophers describe as our "intersubjectivity."27 The excessiveness of 
our individualism has enabled us to be blind to the extent to which our successes, 
our achievements, _our comforts, our privileges have come at a cost: others' 
defeats, others' abuse, others' impoverishment, others' subordination.28 Indeed, so 
pervasive and systemic has been the myopia and the deafness, that we can neither 
see nor bear the existential needs of others unless they cease being different and 
become the same as us. 
In recent years, however, among the mainstream there has been a gradually 
increasing consciousness of liberalism's inability to transcend the paradox of free­
dom embedded in oppression. {Those who had been marginalized always recog­
niz.ed the failure . . . they lived it.} A number of thinkers have begun to recognize 
the equality, integrity, value and moral worth of others and have argued that 
26"Towards a Politics of Hope" (1989) 3 CJ.W.L. (forthcoming). 
Z7 See for example, Jurgel) Habennas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. II, Ufeworld and System (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1988) 
� is true not only on the personal level but also on the macro-politic.al level. As one commentator puts it,"the 
West has become a tower of success for a few victors on a human platform of many victims." Rebecca Chopp, The 
Praxis of Suffering. (Maiyknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986) at 28. As Walter Benjamin reminds us, we must learn to 
reread history from the underside and against the grain. Illuminations (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1969) at 
251. 
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those of us who are privileged have a responsibility that goes beyond the self. In 
philosophy, Michael Ignatieff has urged us to respond to the Needs of Strangers 
(1984) while Larry Blum has encouraged us to expand our practice of Friendship, 
Altruism and Morality (1980). Social theorist Roberto Mangabeira Unger, in an 
essay on human personality entitled Passion (1984), argues at length against the 
false dichotomy of self and other, highlighting instead the radical interrelatedness 
of human existence, our mutual interdependence. More importantly, in an earlier 
work he tentatively adumbrates an alternative conception of social interaction 
that allows us to recreate community without regressing to status. Central to this 
reconstruction is "solidarity," a political agenda which he characterizes as, "love 
struggling to move beyond the circle of intimacy."29 He continues, 
The kernel of solidarity is our feeling of responsibility for those whose lives touch 
in some way upon our own and our greater or lesser willingness to share in their 
fate. Solidarity is the social face of love: it is concern with another as a person 
rather than just respect for him [sic] as a bearer of formally equal rights and 
duties or admiration for his [sic] gifts and achievements.30 
This discourse of solidarity and responsibility for others remains, un­
fortunately, at a disconcertingly high level of abstraction. Let me attempt to be a 
little more specific. Parallelling these efforts of male academics to redirect and 
reforge political power and morality, several feminist scholars have also been 
articulating a theory and practice that can be understood as critical, deviationist 
and reconstructive. They concentrate their efforts on what they call "an ethic of 
care." I want to make reference to the work of two such advocates, Carol Gil­
ligan, and Joan Tronto. My thesis is that solidarity and care are mutual cognates. 
Carol Gilligan, a developmental psychologist, is also seriously concerned 
about the bifurcation of self and other.31 Specifically, she takes issue with 
Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development and particularly his proposi­
tion that the highest stage of moral development is individual autonomy. She is 
discomfited by the fact that when women are measured against the Kohlbergian 
structure they tend to achieve the highest level, autonomy, less frequently.32 
Gilligan refuses to believe that women are less morally developed than men and 
29Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Law in Modem Society (New York: Free �. 1976) at 207. 
30Jbid., 206. Similarly, Freire attempts to disconnect love from "pathological possessiveness" so that It can en­
courage the "liberation of subjects." ThL Politics of Educalion, supra, note 2 at 82. For a homologous feminist ju­
risprudential efl'ort to reclaim love for feminist transformation see Colker, "Consciousness and Love: Towards a 
Feminist-Theological Dialogue" [unpublished). 
31Carol Gilligan, In A DifferenJ Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). [Hereinafter Voice.) 
32Nor are women the only "less developed" group. Blacks, Hispanics and members of the working class also tend 
to score lower on the hierarchy, as even Kohlberg is forced to admil (See A. Cortese, "Moral Development in 
Chicano and Anglo Children" (1982) 4 Hispanic Journal of Behavioural Science 353; J. Broughton, ''1be Genesis 
of Moral Domination" in S. Modgil and C. Modgil, (eds) ., Lawrence Koh/berg: Consensus and Conll'rWOJy 
(London: Fahner Press, 1986), 363; and Koblberg, ThL Psychology of Moral Developmenl (San Fransico: Harper 
and Row, 1984), TT. ) We can only be 80181.Cd by the hegemony of a theory, the explanatory capacity of which is 
based upon its ability to exclude "deviant data." Similar concerns will come to light below when I briefly discus& 
the LSAT. 
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calls into question the comprehensiveness or appropriateness of the theory. She 
suggests that the theory incorporates an androcentric bias in that the data base 
upon which the theory was constructed was primarily composed of men. Her fur­
ther suggestion is that extreme bifurcation and an unmodified autonomy may be 
more characteristic of, but not essential to, men than it is of women. Emphatical­
ly, that does not mean than women are less morally developed than men, it mere­
ly suggests than women's morality may be different from that which is priorized 
by Kohlbergian theory. 
The significance of Gilligan's argument goes beyond the critique of 
androcentric bias--although that is important--for she also tentatively identifies 
what the substantive difference of women's different voice might be, what she 
calls an "ethic of care." As she says, "Yet in the different voice of women lies the 
truth of an ethic of care, the tie between relationship and responsibility and the 
origins of aggression in the failure of connection. "33 
Gilligan's discussion of the ethic of care is not developed in any cohesive or 
comprehensive sense. Rather it surfaces in her work as a corrective or comple­
ment to "the logic of justice," "the premise of equality," as a resisting 
countermorality to the morality of exclusive rights. However, I think it is possible 
to distill from her reflections some of its interlocking components. The central 
insight of an ethic of care is an awareness of the constitutive interconnection and 
interdependence of the self and other. This consciousness of mutuality militates 
against isolation, exclusion and separatism, with their correlative potential for 
selfishness, subordination, aggression and violence. Rather, this awareness en­
courages a recognition of, and enthusiasm for, the needs of others and a willing­
ness to respond compassionately and responsibli to those needs,
34 to participate 
in the lived experiences and reality of others. An ethic of care identifies "a 
world of mutuality'' that "creates and sustains the human community."36 It recon­
ceptualizes and reconstructs moral dilemmas to be issues of competing 
responsibilities of the self because of its connection with and responsibility for 
others, rather than a conflict between self and other in which the only options are 
assertion of the setrs trumping rights, or martyred self-sacrifice on the pyre of 
altruism.37 Finally, and importantly, not only does the ethic encourage a discourse 
and praxis that rejects domination, it strives to resolve moral dilemmas without 
recourse to violence as that would counteract "the injunction not to hurt 
others."38 Thus, the ethic of care aspires to "a more generative view of human 
33Voice, supra, note 31 at 173. 
34Voice, supra, note 31 at 62 and 74-98. 
�Voice, supra, note 31 at 79. A similar theme can also be located in Martha Minow, "Justice Engendered" (1988), 
101 Harvard Law Review at 14, " . . .  the perspective to seek out and appreciate a perspective other than ones own . 
. . ," and in Unger's idea of"negative capability," Politics Vol. II, supra, note 25. 
36voice at 156. 
37Voice at 114. 
38Voice at 73, 102, 134, 149, 174. 
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life,"3') and even more ambitiously, an affirmative transformation of the polity.40 
Feminists' reflections upon the "ethic of care " have also been expanded and 
concretized by political and moral philosopher, Joan Tronto.41 Tronto forcefully 
argues against the dangerous anti-modern and essentialist tendency among some 
feminists of reducing an ethic of care to women's difference. Rather, she cau­
tiously attempts to develop the ethic of care so that it can rest on its own political, 
philosophical and moral base, independent of our biological facts, with the result 
that it becomes potentially accessible to us all, as an alternative to the rampant in­
dividualism of conventional wisdom. 
She suggests that the core of care is an awareness of relationalism, that it in­
volves both "ongoing responsibility and commitment " to others. Drawing a use­
ful distinction between "caring about " and "caring for " she posits that the latter 
"involves responding to the particular concrete, physical, spiritual, intellectual, 
psychic and emotional needs of others."42 However, Tronto is careful to dis­
tinguish between a "feminist " and a "feminine " approach to care, arguing that 
the former maintains the integrity and autonomy of the "self," whereas the latter 
runs the risk of falling into a "romanticized notion of selflessness "43 which is 
simply the reproduction of women's male constructed role. The "ethic of care " 
does not resolve the issue of the relationship between self and other, but it does 
39Voice at 174. 
40It is important to point out, though, that the ethic of care is distinct from the traditional masculinist stereotype of 
"female self-abnegation and moral self-sacrifice," (Voice at 90) what Virginia Woolf has descnbed as "The Angel 
in the House" (Women and Writing S9 (New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1979)). It should not be con­
fused with passivity or delicacy, submissiveness or obedience, dependence or domesticity; it is not what Irigaray 
has posited to be a "phallic feminine," (Cited in C. Duchen, Feminism in France (London: Rutledge & kegan Paul, 
1984) at 87] nor "a romantic prescription for chaining women to the classical definition of femininity" (K. Karst, 
"Women's Constitution," Duke LJ. 447, 480 (1984)). EmpbaticaUy, although there is some verbal intersection, the 
ethic of care is not what Catharine MacKinnon has described as "contemporary industrial society's version of 
woman . . . docile, soft, passive, nuturant, vulnerable, weak, narcissistic, childlike, incompetent, masochistic and 
domestic, made for child care, home care and husband care." "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An 
Agenda for Theory" (1982) 7 Signs 515 at S30. Moreover, lest there be any confusion, I want to stress that nothing 
in my suggestions is premised upon the idea that the ethic of care grows out of the rosy private family life of 
women. For many women the family is anything but a haven in a heartless world; it is, in many instances, the locus 
of extreme domination, subordination, inequality and violence. Indeed, Gilligan's own example refutes such self­
negation, for at least some of the women to whom she listened decided to have abortions, thereby demonstrating 
that care does not necessarily priorize the other over the self. Rather, care attempts to consider the interests of the 
other in a responsive and responsible manner. 1be ethic of care includes care for oneself (Voice at 139). It denies 
the absolutist, formalistic recourse to individual autonomy by favouring an "injunction against hurting" so that we 
have to seriously and contextually make moral decisions and, at the same time, bear responsibility for that choice, 
and its consequences for others as well as ourselves. 1be ethic of care necessitates a keen consciousness of the 
"social consequences of action" (Voice at 167) and, I would add inaction. 
41"Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care" (1987) 12 Signs 644; "Women and Caring: What Can Femi­
nists Learn About Morality From Caring" in A. Jaggar and S. Bordo, (eds.) Body Gender and Knowledge 
(forthcoming); "Rationalizing Racism, Sexism and Other Forms of Prejudice: Otherness in Moral and Feminist 
Theory" (unpublished). 
42"Women and Caring" ibid. at 4, see also 8-11 (emphasis added). 
43/bid. at 12. Nel Nod� Caring: A Feminine Approach to Etlucs and Moral Education (Berkeley : University of 
California Press, 1984) in the most explicit "feminine" elaboration of care. 
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identify and reconceptualize the problem to emphasize the needs of others and to 
highlight the importance of contextualized responses. Moreover, the ramifica­
tions of such an ethos are large .for we may be required to "restructure broader 
social and political institutions if caring for others is to be made a more central 
part of the lives of everyone in society.'>44 Legal education, I want to suggest, is 
one such institution. 
For some these references to love, solidarity, intersubjectivity, responsibility 
and care may appear nebulous, indeterminate or unspecific. Even mushy. They 
do, however, tentatively suggest the ethicai political and philosophical founda­
tions for a praxis that confronts what I earlier identified as the twin evils of the 
modernist malaise: the paradox of freedom embedded in domination, and the 
self-indulgent cynicism of oppressive consumerism. Moreover� it is, I think, pos­
sible to be even more emphatic in specifying the requirements of an/other legal 
educational process: law schools should operate a preferential option for the poor 
and the oppressed. This proposition is not a slogan, it is not simply a pithy encap­
sulation of a preferred political agenda, although it is that too and therefore 
strategically and ideologically significant. Rather, it is a proposal that is designed 
to 
(a) make explicit the integral connection between knowledge and power, 
(b) highlight who at this present moment are the benefactors and losers in 
this power network, 
(c) demand that emphasis be relocated so as to challenge the citadels of tra­
ditional power, be they public or private, and 
(d) in recognition of the centrality of law in contemporary power relations, 
to locate responsibility for the continued pervasiveness of inequality, in 
part, on the shoulders of legal educators.45 
This preferential option is simultaneously an opportunity and a responsibility. 
At this point, now that I have tentatively traced what I consider to be the 
ethico-political foundations of the reconstructive agenda, I want to briefly touch 
upon Harry Arthur's paper and to provide an indication of the critical distance 
between our alternative positions. Although, at one point, he does refer to the re­
lationship between law and empowerment, his proposal for freeing people from 
bondage seems to revolve around the maturation of legal education through the 
double dynamic of (i) unshackling the legal academy from the profession and (ii) 
enhancing interdisciplinary scholarship. Undoubtedly, these are important 
proposals and they do in fact dovetail with much of my own work which in­
corporates such a transdisciplinary impulse. 
44"Women and Caring," ibid. at 23. 
45For a helpful discussion of the relationship between knowledge, power and responsibility in relation to literature 
see Frank I..entriccha, Criticism and Socio/ Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). 
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However, I fear that the Arthurian proposal does not go far enough, and 
worse, it runs the very serious danger of misallocating the weight of our limited 
critical capacity. For example, in his discussion of equality he suggested that, as 
lawyers, we could gain a lot from philosophers. True, but I think we could be a lot 
more relevant, more in tune with the structures, practices and impact of in­
equality, if we had greater contact with those who are the victims of inequality, 
constituents who do not tend to be professional philosophers or lawyers.46 The 
preferential option goes far beyond the pluralistic preference for opening up the 
conversation to other insiders; it actually changes the problem by creating space 
for the outsiders so that they can redefme the issues and the remedies. 
V. An Example: Confronting The Racism of Contemporary Legal Education 
The whole pyramid of discrimination rests on solid extra­
economic foundation--education. 
Juliet Mitchell47 
While it is vital to think globally, it is even more important to act locally. The 
foregoing reflections provide us with a critical and reconstructive context, they al­
low us to understand that the politics and pathologies of contemporary Canadian 
legal education are interconnected with, and the product of, much broader social, 
economic, political intellectual and cultural forces, what I have described as 
modernity. But in the same way that it is not possible to argue everything at once, 
we cannot expect to change everything at once. We must begin to remake the 
matrices of social interaction interstitially, in the various realms of activity in 
which we find ourselves as social beings. I am, among other things, a legal 
educator, and it is in this realm that I want to concretize some of these thoughts. 
Despite the efforts of the Canadian legal system over the last couple of 
decades at the constitutional, legislative, regulatory or, on occasion, judicial levels, 
discrimination, dispossession, marginalization, abuse, and inequality are still per­
vasive and systemic components of the social structure. Even if the self perception 
of Canada as a mosaic is descriptively accurate--although that this may be more 
rhetoric than reality--1 wonder whether that image incorporates a sufficiently 
egalitarian impulse. As an artifact, there is an element of authorial intentionality 
which chooses to priorize, emphasize and combine certain pieces, thereby devalu­
ing and marginalizing the other, noncentralized components. By recognizing the 
artifactual nature of the mosaic and identifying the role of an author we must ask: 
who is the author, does s/he have a racial, socio-economic, or gendered context; 
how did s/he get the time, space, or energy to develop his or her talents; why are 
46Although I don't think Hany Arthurs was doing so, there is a real danger in overemphasizing the constraints 
which the profession imposes on university legal education. Too often such references to structural constraints are 
used as a cop-out from present responsibilities. Professional constraints are real, but they are not total. 
47Juliet Mitchell, cited in E. Young Breuhl, "The Education. of Women as Philosophers" (1987) 12 Signs 207 at 
209. 
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certain pieces priorized and others decentralized and, even more importantly, by 
what criteria? By identifying context and choice, we confront the necessary com­
ponent of subjectivity and are plunged into the politics of the aesthetic. The 
politics of the polity or legal education are not qualitatively different. 
There are many groups in Canadian society who are impoverished and op­
pressed on the basis of class, sex, race, ethnic origins,48 sexual orientation,49 age, 
etc. And yet university based legal education, as I have indicated above, does not 
deal adequately with such pervasive and structured inequality. Undoubtedly, 
many schools have courses that touch upon or deal with such issues but these are 
still understood by many faculty and students alike to be "soft," deviant and in­
ferior, not "the real law." The proposal to exercise a preferential option for the 
poor and oppressed is an attempt to confront this inequality in a direct and un­
compromising way, to rethink and reconsider what in fact "reality" is,50 and, in­
directly, to raise the question of who has the power to define "reality." 
If we are to take this preferential option seriously, at least three issues must 
be confronted: who we teach, how we teach, and what we teach. At this point, I 
want to concentrate on the first of these issues, although I will also make brief 
references to the other questions. In particular, I want to make some tentative 
proposals51 in relation to legal education for Indigenous Peoples.52 This is so for 
several reasons. First, I think that racism is deeply embedded in Canadian society, 
and at all levels.53 Second, by focusing on the process of legal education for In­
digenous Peoples we can begin to think about similar processes for other sub­
ordinated groups, although we should not anticipate simple transplantation for al­
though domination is pervasive, it is also particular.54 Third, for better or worse, 
48Subhas Ramcharan, supra, note 3. 
49Gary Kinsman, The Regulation of Desire: Sexuality in Canoda (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1987) 
50See further Toni Pickard, "Is Real Life Finally Happening?" (1986) 2 CJ.W.L 150. 
51Tois point cannot be sufficiently emphasized. What follows should not be understood as a blueprint for in• 
digenous legal education that strives to provide the right answers. Rather it is a suggested agenda that is designed 
to respond to the very low numbers of legally trained indigenous persons, to create a space in order that they can 
develop their own agenda, to enable them to effectively mobilize in pursuit of equality, to use the law school as a 
zone that is at least partially open to difference. There must be a great deal more input from indigenous com­
munities into any project for reconstruction of legal education. My project is an effort to facilitate that input. 
Moreover, nothing in these suggestions should be understood as a fetisbization of law or legal education. 
Neither can provide a solution to the problem of racism or the pervasiveness of deprivation. However, law and 
legal education are important arenas of social interaction; they should not be ignored in any proposal that pursues 
substantive equality. 
52i use this term in a generic sense, to refer to "status indians," "non-status indians," "metis" and "inuits" but 
without any desire to downplay the important differences that distinguish them from each other or the differences 
of each individual person. Some of the suggestions of this paper will need to be tailored to the particular needs of 
each of these rommunities. 
53See supra, note 3. 
54.rwo further points are worth noting. Although classism, racism, sexism and heterosexism are not reduable one 
to the other they are, I think, interronnected. Therefore, if we can get a critical angle on one we can use that as a 
starting point in relation to the others. Thus it seems to me to be both UDDeCe8S8JY and harmful to pursue the 
question of "which is more important : race, class or sex?" Secondly, the claim of this paper is not that racism, 
sexism etc. is "caused" by the separation of the self and other. Rather, it is that a critical ronsciousness of the 
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Canada is becoming an increasingly legalized society. Power and the discourse of 
power are increasingly being filtered through legal-constitutional processes, and 
Indigenous Peoples cannot afford to be structurally and epistemologically ex­
cluded from this relocation of the fora of power. An interrelated point is that this 
relocation necessitates an even greater dependence on lawyers, and it is clearly 
better if such lawyers come from their own community rather than being well 
meaning outsiders.55 Confidence and the "ability to know'' are important and, 
given our long history of oppression, neglect and abuse, we should hardly wonder 
if the Indigenous Peoples would prefer to be their own analysts and spokesper­
sons. Trust is better than dependency.56 Fifth, I would suggest that we have an 
ethico-constitutional responsibility to provide substantive education to Indigenous 
Peoples, based on our treaty obligations57 and our historical refusal to seriously 
honour them. Finally, I sense that, increasingly, the Indigenous PeoEles will no 
longer acquiesce in their enforced inequality, that they will "irrupt " 8 and chal­
lenge the hegemony of those of us who occupy the power elite and that the legal 
system will prove to be as much a barrier as an instrument of relief in their quest 
for self determination.SCJ Indigenous Peoples must know the law to know what 
they are up against.00 
pathologies of fear-driven otherness enables us to acknowledge our fears and then, perhaps, to immobilize them as 
engines of domination. 
55Even without the legalization of politics it would still be beneficial for Indigenous Peoples to have access to legal 
education in that, historically, lawyers have played an extremely important role in Canadian politics, exercising an 
"influence . . .  out of all proportion to their numbers." Hany Arthurs et al''The Canadian Legal Profession" 
(1986) A.B.F. Res. J.447 at 465. 
56i suppose that I have in mind Antonio Gramsci's idea of "organic intellectuals." See Prison Notebooks (New 
York: International Publishers, 1971). 
57 See H.B. Hawthorne, A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada: Economic, Political, Educalional Needs 
and Policies (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967) Vol II; Alexander Morris, supra, note 1. 
SSpor an important discussion of the "irruption of the poor'' see Gustavo Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in His­
tory (Maryknoll, N. Y.: Orbis Books, 1983). 
59For an excellent discussion see Leroy Little Bear, Menno Boldt, J. Anthony Long, eds., PaJhways to Self 
Detemunation (foronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984). 
001 am also acutely conscious of a countervailing concern. There is a real danger that the endeavour to create 
spaces for indigenous people is itself a form of neocolonialism in that, given legal education's socializing role, my 
proposals will have the effect of further expanding the hegemony of the dominant culture, eliminating difference 
rather than encouraging it. From this perspective, "separatism" is a preferable mode of resistance. 
My own position is that I do not believe that we should conceive of participation and separatism as mutually 
exclusive polarities, as a dichotomous either/or choice. Rather, it may be more empowering to conceptualize them 
as two mutually reinforcing strategies on a progreMive continuum. The choice when to use one, the other, or both, 
must depend on the context and an acute critical awareness of the dangers of each: incorporationism or 
entrenched marginalization. Moreover, I believe that choice must be made by the Indigenous Peoples themselves, 
not by non-indigenous persons for that would be an exercise in paternalism and disempowerment. My proposals 
are a modest attempt to make the ability to choose a possibility. 
Even more optimistically, as my espousal of difference may indicate, I would hope for an expansion of in­
digenous legal cultures to the extent that they might even contribute to a reconstruction of the dominant culture. 
As Paulo Freire noted, "As the oppressed, fighting to be human, take away the oppressor's power to dominate and 
suppress, they restore to the oppressors the humanity they had lost in the exercise of their oppression." Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970) 
I should also add that nothing in the text should be construed as suggesting that law may be a panacea for 
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Any proposal in relation to education must pay keen attention to the 
relevant context. This cannot be emphasized enough in any discussion of legal ed­
ucation in relation to Indigenous Peoples. Put simply, Indigenous Peoples live in 
a situation of social deprivation and economic dispossession61 and that awareness 
should be our contextual starting point. As statistics from the last census indicate, 
Indigenous Peoples are significantly poorer than other Canadians, they experi­
ence significantly higher unemployment rates and lower health, housing and edu­
cational conditions.62 Mortality rates for infants, children and adults are fright­
eningly higher than the national averages. Indigenous children are significantly 
over-represented in the child welfare system, while juveniles and adults are par­
ticularly conspicuous as the recipients of the attention of the repressive appara­
tuses of the state, what we euphemistically call our "justice and correctional sys­
tems."63 
the problems of the Indigenous Peoples or any other disadvantaged group. At best, it might help resist the oppres­
sion. For an excellent American ac.count of how law both helps to pursue, yet fails to achieve, racial justice see 
Derrick Bell, And We An! Not Saved: The Elusive Quest For Racial Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1987). 
61 Report of the Special Committee on Indian Se/f-GovemmenJ: Indian Self-Government in Canada. (Ottawa, Queen's 
Printer, 1983) (The Penner Report). 1983. 
62Canada's Native People (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1984) 
63Donald Purich reminds us that "native people represent 9 per cent of the national prison population but, at 
most, form 5 per cent of the population. In some provinces . . .  they represent over 40 per cent of the prison popu­
lation." "Affirmative Action in Canadian Law Schools: The Native Student in Law School" (1986-87) 51 ·Sask. L 
Rev. 79 at fn. 1. The following lengthy quotation is even more specific in its indictment: 
In the case of the statistics regarding the impact of the criminal justice system on native people the fig­
ures are so stark and appalling that the magnitude of the problem can be neither misunderstood nor 
interpreted away. Government figures--which reflect different definitions of "native" and which prob­
ably underestimate the number of prisoners who consider themselves native--show that almost 10% of 
the federal penitentiaJy population is native (including about 13% of the federal women's prisoner 
population) compared to about 2% of the population nationally. In the west and northern parts of 
Canada where there are relatively high concentrations of native communities, the over-representation 
is more dramatic. In the Prairie region, natives make up about 5% of the total population but 32% of 
the penitentiary population and in the Pacific region native prisoners constitute about 12% of the 
penitentiaJy population while less than 5% of the region's general population is of native ancestry. 
Even more disturbing. the disproportionality is growing. Thus, in 1965 some 22% of the prisoners in 
Stony Mountain Penitentiary were native; in 1984 this proportion was 33%. It is realistic to expect that 
absent radical change, the problem will intensify due to the higher birth rate of native communities . . .  
Bad as this situation is within the federal system, in a number of the western provincial correc­
tional systems, it is even worse. In B.C. and Alberta, native people, representing 3-5% of the pro­
vince's population constitute 16% and 17% of the a�ions to prison. In Manitoba and Sas­
katchewan, native people, representing 6-7% of the population constitute 46% and 60% of prison ad­
missions. 
A study reviewing a�ions to Saskatchewan's correctional system in 1976-77 . .. .  contains find­
ings that should shock the conscience of everyone in Canada. In comparison to male non-natives, 
male treaty Indians were 25 times more likely to be admitted to a provincial correctional centre while 
non-status Indians or Metis were 8 times more likely to be admitted. If only the population over 15 
years of age is considered . . .  then male treaty Indians were 37 times more likely to be admitted, while 
male non-status Indians were 12 times more likely to be admitted. For women the figures are even 
more extreme. A treaty Indian woman was 131 times more likely to be admitted and a non-status or 
Metis woman 28 times more likely. 
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In the light of these factors--and we should remember that these are socio­
political factors, not natural or essential64--it should not be surprising to find that 
the Indigenous Peoples are dramatically under-represented in the legal com­
munity. Before the early seventies the number of Indigenous lawyers in all of 
Canada could be counted on one hand.� Although this number has steadily in­
creased over the last two decades, there is hardly cause for celebration or ac­
quiescence for there are still probably less than one hundred.(i6 As of the time of 
writing, there are a few graduate students who are of indigenous background, a 
couple of lower level judges but no full time law teachers.67 A report from 
Manitoba recommends that for the Indigenous Peoples to be proportionately 
represented in the legal community there would need to be 1500 indigenous law­
yers!68 
The legal academy recognizes that people from an indigenous background 
rarely achieve their LLB status. However, more often than not this is understood 
as the failure of the students to come to terms with the requirements--intellectual 
and psychological,.-of the law school, although sometimes modified with the 
recognition that law schools need to do more. I want to suggest that this aware­
ness of responsibility is misallocated, that although the burden lies on both the 
students and the institution, the law schools need to accept greater responsibility, 
to recognize that we fail them more than they fail law school. Our addiction to 
sameness only allows us to tolerate difference, not to foster it. The preferential 
option brings into vivid relief the distinction between believing ourselves to non­
racist and being actively anti-racist.!9 
In the light of these propositions I want to suggest that we fail Canada's In­
digenous Peoples at every stage of the university legal educational process: in 
The Saskatchewan study brin� home the implications of its findin� by indicating that a treaty 
Indian boy turning 16 in 1976 had a 70% chance of at least one stay in prison by the age of 25 . . . .  The 
corresponding figure for non-status or Melis was 34%. For a non-native Saskatchewan boy the figure 
was 8%. Put another way, this means that in Saskatchewan, prison has become for young native men, 
the promise of a just society which high school and college represents for the rest of us. 
LocJcing up Natives in Canada--A Report of tM Committee of tM Canadian Bar AssociaJU>n on Imprisonment and 
Release(1988). at 2-3. (footnotes omitted) 
641 would go further and suggest that they provide irrefutable evidence of racism . . .  if not intentional, then struc• 
tural and institutional. 
�miy So Few?, supra, note 1 at 31. 
�ch, supra, note 63 at 100. 
67Purich, ibid., note 63 at 81. There are some part time law teachers of indigenous background and Dalhousie Law 
School bas just appointed the first full time teacher for the academic year beginning 1989. There have, however, 
been justices of the peace in several provinces and territories, as well as R.C.M.P. officers who have an indigenous 
heritage. LocJcing Up Natives., supra, note 63 at 40-41. 
68miy So Few?, supra, note 1 at 32. 
!9See Wolverton, supra, note 3 at 191. 
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recruitment, in admissions, in participation and involvement, and in completion.70 
The deracialization of legal education must confront the following concerns. 
(a) Recruitment 
Although as law schools there is not a great deal that we can do to improve 
the quality of the pre-law school education of indigenous candidates, we still have 
a role to play.71 It is inappropriate for us to expect indigenous people to apply to 
law school in the same way that the mainstream of students do, on the premise of 
a free market economy of application. For many indigenous people law school 
will not come within their ken of possible careers. This is because of the educa­
tional deprivation which they have suffered, the consciousness that law is still the 
preserve of the elite, and a feeling of the alien nature of whiteman's law, that it 
has been, and continues to be, a tool of the dominant culture's imperialist and 
racist agenda.72 To counteract these legitimate and not inaccurate concerns, but 
without ignoring Indigenous People's experiential understanding, law schools 
must develop an active recruitment program designed to attract indigenous 
people to university. And we must start early, by contacting those who are in­
volved with the secondary level education of indigenous people so that they might 
encourage students to contemplate law school as a feasible career path. We 
should go into indigenous schools and discuss such possibilities with the students. 
Similar efforts should be made with community counsellors. This should be 
repeated with those indigenous students who attend university, and those who in­
teract with them. 
Current pre-law school programs should be expanded, honed and developed 
to respond to the particular needs of indigenous students.73 Particular emphasis 
should be placed upon the development of communicative--written and oral--and 
study skills. 74 
70
See, Why So Few?, supra, note 1. 
71For a convincing critique of the failure of Canada's past and present attempts to provide education for the In­
digenous Peoples see James S. Frideres, NaJive People in Canada, Comemporary Conflicts. (Scarborough, Ont: 
Prentice-Hall Canada, 1983) at 156-174. See, for example, presentations made to the Marshall lnquily, 24th No­
vember, 1988. 
72
See also Purich, supra, note 63 at 84-8.5. 
73For a discussion of the ACCESS programme at the University of Manitoba, see Why So Few?, supra, note 1 at 
37-39. The programme of Legal Studies for Native Students which is located in Saskatoon, is the only pre-Jaw ex­
perience for indigenous people in Canada. Although it has had an impressive track record, it could certainly 
benefit from greater support, financial and intellectual. This, however, is not a focus of this paper. For discussions, 
see Why So Few?, supra, note 1 at 40-54: Purich, supra, note 63 at 92-97. 
74Mary Ellen Turpel has suggested that, at this point, I face a tricky contradiction. First, there is the patemalistic 
problem of who is to determine what the "needs" of indigenous people are? This is brought into relief by my 
proposal that we develop "communicative and study" skills. The implicit assumption in my proposal is that in­
digenous students have to comply with our communicative and study skills, implying that their skills, developed in 
their community, are inadequate. In other words, our standards remain the benchmark, and indigenous people 
"need" support to achieve our standards. Viewed in this light, "needs" are relativized, and more importantly, 
predefined by a framework of ethnocentric assumptions. 
I think that there is much force in this criticism, although, as I have indicated in footnote 60, given our cur­
rent context, it is important to forge a middle path (which is, I think, different from compromise) that allows for 
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In recent years law schools in general, and law deans in particular, have had 
to develop the talent of fund raising in order to make up the short fall created by 
the governmental retreat from third level education. This new found ability to 
generate funds should be utilized for the benefit of indigenous students. We 
should fulfill an active lobbying function to ensure that potential indigenous can­
didates can be confident that they will attain total and adequate financial support 
in the nature of a non-returnable grant, so as to modify any worries about the 
financial toll of third level education.75 
(b) Admissions 
Law schools should develop feasible and realistic entrance requirements. In 
recognition of the fact that so few indigenous people actually make it to third 
level education, it may be desirable to conditionally waive the normal two-year 
undergraduate requirement for those candidates who demonstrate aptitude in 
other ways, what we sometimes refer to as "maturity, experience and motivation. " 
Particular attention must be paid to the applicability of the LSAT test to in­
digenous students. First, we must remember that the real significance of the test 
for law schools is that it serves as a mechanism of attrition; given the very high 
application rates, law schools use the test to render the numbers manageable. 
This consideration should not apply to indigenous people for our goal must be to 
facilitate their entry into law school, not to inhibit them. Secondly, there are in­
dications that the test incorporates cultural biases that may disadvantage mem­
bers of minority groups.76 If this is even a possibility we should not rely on the test 
as it further prejudices the possibility of indigenous candidates gaining access. 
Third, it seems clear that the test is a poor predictor of how minority students 
will actually perform if they get to law school.77 If this is true, then again it is only 
of very limited utility for our current project, that of creating space for indigenous 
the Indigenous Peoples to have power in both traditions. 
75In the last year this concern has come centre stage. While the federal government, on the one band, appears to 
be supporting the Indigenous Peoples in their quest for self government, on the other it is effectively making such 
an achievement unrealizable because of its slashing of financial support for indigenous students. On June 17, 1988 
the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development unveiled its Draft Policy on Post-Secondaty Student 
Assistance Program, to become effective April 1, 1989. In effect this program will cut both the amount of money 
actually paid to indigenous students on a monthly basis, and the length of time they will be eligible for governmen­
tal assistance. With particular reference to indigenous students in law schoo� this means that their funding may 
run out in the course of their second year. This suggests that the federal administration either does not, or does not 
want to, understand the dift'erence between formal and substantive equality, and that it fails to recognize its own 
contn'bution to what Derek Bok calls "the culture of deprivation with its ...  array of disincentives and depriva­
tions." [Higher Leaming, supro, note 13 at 139.) legal educators must also educate the government if they want to 
educate indigenous people. 
76See, for example, David M. White, Tuwards a Diversijkd uga/ Profession (San Francisco: Julian Richardson As­
sociates For the National Conference of Black Lawyers, 1981) at 149-181; Portia Y.T. Hamler, "Minority Tokenism 
in American Law Schools" (1983) Howard Law Journal 443, at 493-506; Robert Linn, ''Test Bias and the Predic­
tion of Grades in Law School" (1975) 27 Journal of Legal Education. 
77 See eg Puricb, supro, note 63 at 87-88. 
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people. Consequently, I would suggest that we abandon the LSA T test altogether 
for indigenous afsplicants, or at least only use it to determine the lowest possible 
entrance point. 8 However, given the stress, cost, and disadvantage caused to 
those who are preparing for the test, even this last justification may not carry too 
much weight. 
What these proposals suggest is that we need to actively reflect upon the as­
sumptions that underpin our understandings of university legal education, to 
question their appropriateness for those who are marginalized by the 
mainstream, and, indeed, to identify the structural biases that these assumptions 
incorporate. Restated, university legal education is essentially front-end loaded, it 
is more difficult to get in than it is to get out. But the evidence for indigenous stu­
dents is different; if it is difficult to get in, it is just as difficult to get out. The non­
completion rate is disturbingly high. The proposed remedy is to refocus our con­
cern, to make it easier to get in, and then, to help them to the best of our abilities 
so that they can also get out. 
(c) Counselling and Tutoring 
Given the structural disadvantages that indigenous people experience, it is es­
sential that we go beyond the open door and equal opportunity in order to make 
the legal opportunity effectively realizable. To abandon indigenous students on 
admittance is to set them up for failure, our failure, not theirs . . .  although it will 
be they, not the institution, who will suffer the psychological consequences of such 
a failure. We must ensure that the open door is not, in effect, a revolving door. 
If the students request,79 tutorials should be provided in order to continue to 
develop communicative, study and examination skills which they had picked up in 
the pre-law program.80 Moreover, these tutorials should be dovetailed with the 
substantive courses that the students are taking in order to simultaneously devel­
op legal analytic skills. 
In terms of staffing such a need, there should be assigned a full time faculty 
member whose sole opportunity is to assist the development of minority legal ed­
ucation.81 Futhermore, funding should also be provided to hire upper year stu-
78/bid. at 119. 
79In recognition of indigenous student's autonomy and to avoid forced paternalism, tutorials should be offered on 
an "as needed" basis, with the choice being left with the students. However, it is hoped that the support structure 
will be sufficiently encouraging that communication gaps can be modified, enabling students to take advantage of 
the a.uistance when they recognize they need it. 
80For a useful, non-legal model of the structure of such seminars see for example, The Monash Orientalion Scheme 
for Aborigina Handbook (Clayton, Australia : Monash University, 1987) at 13-14. 
81Various other functions could also fall on this person, primarily in their role as "contact" person. Discrimination 
is still a pervasive factor for many minorities when seeking living accommodation. Law schools, through this faculty 
advisor, must attempt to avoid such problems by consulting with such students and through the contacts they might 
have in the community. Or, again, this faculty member, in liaison with the indigenous students, should attempt to 
help identify and procure both summer and post degree employment that is both relevant and desirable. 
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dents on a part time basis to act as tutors on a one to one basis with each in­
digenous student. 82 If possible, this faculty member or the tuto,rs should be in­
digenous persons also. At the very least they should have extensive interaction 
with an education specialist who has particular knowledge of minority needs. 
This proposal may appear to be very expensive, but if we are to take our re­
sponsibility seriously we must make such financial and institutional investments, 
even, or especially, if it is at the expense of other programmes, whether they be 
traditional bastions or fancy new interdisciplinary efforts.
83 This is, after all, a 
82See further Purich, supra, note 63 at 98. I may disagree with Purich in his suggestion that the tutorials should not 
single out indigenous students. I think that the problems that indigenous students face are peculiar and particular 
and we should not risk overburdening the tutors. However, there is a real �ibility that some, or perhaps even 
all, indigenous students will not want such concentrated attention. My position is that we should be willing and 
able to provide such support if it is wanted by the students; we should be in a position of institutional prepared­
ness. Ar. I have suggested elsewhere, the opinion of either Purich or myself should be secondary and responsive, 
rather than determinative. 
8¾bere is a vitally important context here that we simply cannot afford to ignore . . .  nor should we permit it to 
become an escape mechanism by which we can avoid developing remedies against institutionalized racism. 
The current economic and political environment for universities is far from satisfactory. Put bluntly, al­
though Canadian universities enjoyed a hot house period in the sixties and seventies, many are now struggling to 
survive in the extremely adverse ecological conditions of the 'eighties. The central problem is, of course, funding. 
The political decision-makers in these the twilight years of the twentieth century no longer appear to be committed 
the ideal of third level education. They see it as an expensive luxury that we can hardly afford, as an investment 
that is both quantitatively and qualitatively deficient in terms of returns. The message, implicit rather than explicit, 
is that the educational trough must be filled from alternative sources. 
This retreat from third level education bas at least two deleterious ramifications. Firstly, it means that there 
is a shift in the balance of the universities' dependency from the "public" to the "private" sphere, primarily but not 
exclusively, corporations. This dependency is at once economic, political and ideological. [See, Janice Newson and 
Howard Buchbinder, The University Means Business (foronto: Garamond Press, 1988).) Secondly,the changing 
foundations of funding bas an impact upon the meaning and purpose of "knowledge." Corporations are wise with 
their money, they understand knowledge to be in the service of economic imperatives, and they provide funding 
for relatively specific purposes. Consequentially, the horizons of knowledge are structurally narrowed and even the 
questions to be asked are frequently predefined This increased corporate dependency results in the intensification 
of what has been called "instrumental rationality," at the expense of alternative forms of knowledge. 
Where do law schools fit within this broader educational dynamic? 
It is a common obseivation among legal academics that law schools have a peculiar and particular position 
within the academy. The most important distinguishing feature of law schools is their hybrid status . . .  they are 
part academic, part professional. [See e.g. Harry Arthurs, 'The Law School in a University Setting" in R.Matas 
and D. McCawley, Legal EducaJion in COllOda, supra, note 21 at 157. For a located and poignant account of this 
tension see C. Ian Kyer and Jerome Bickenbacb, The Fiercest-Debate (foronto: Osgoode Society, 1987).) Al­
though this bas been a notorious source of tension, it is also a �ible strength in that the legal &cademy has been 
able to adapt itself to this almost schizoid existence, an adaption that may provide a foundation on which to deal 
with the changes demanded by corporate dependency. I want to suggest that our mongrel nature may be a source 
of resilient creativity, it may provide us with an opportunity for flexibility, innovation, openness and maybe even a 
little transgression. 
A second significant feature about law schools is their position of status within the university. Although it 
would go too far to say that a law school is the jewel in the crown of a university, a law school is an important part 
of the desired image of many universities. Witness, for example, the efforts made by York University to attract Os­
goode Hall to North York. Thus even though our involvement with the academy has been, in the main, relatively 
recent we do add prestige, respect and comprehensiveness to any university. This perception of importance may 
give us a structural advantage over some other departments in our efforts to resist the corporatization of the acad-
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preferential option, an attempt to priorize the needs of the Indigenous Peoples, 
and thus in a world of finite resources it will be at the expense of the mainstream 
agenda. If we choose not to make such an investment, then we choose not to 
respond to the needs of the Indigenous Peoples and in that way we continue and 
reinforce the inequality, oppression and racism imbricated within the Canadian 
polity. Racism is not simply the product of intentionalism, it also comes about 
through omission and negligence. 
Access to counselling should also be available but great care should be taken 
that the counsellors are familiar with the distinctive educational characteristics of 
indigenous students. Furthermore, in pursuit of cohesion, there should be close 
contact between the counsellors, the faculty advisors and the tutors so that they 
can learn from each other. 84 
emy. Our possible advantages and privileges also impose upon us special responsibilities. This paper is an attempt 
to address those responsibilities. 
84See also JJ7Jy So Few, supra, note 1 at 70. These suggestions with regard to tutoring, in tum, generate larger 
questions about how we teach. A full discussion of this issue would necessitate a further article but I do think a 
few comments are appropriate. 
The vast majority of us who are legal educatolll have had little, if any, exposure to the vast array of informa• 
tion that identifies the qualities of a good teacher. In the recruitment process little attention is paid to the criterion 
of ability to teach effectively, and the professorial career structure priorizes research over teaching. The result is 
that we tend to muddle through, learning on the job. Consequently, if some of us are good teachelll it's probably 
only a fluke, while the rest of us probably don't realize just how appalling we are, and how much better we could 
be. Although there is a Canadian law teachelll' clinic, its voluntary and occasional nature means that it can have 
only limited impact upon our pedagogical proficiency. The tendency then is to use our own teachers as role 
models thereby rendering our pedagogical vision retrospective and, perhaps more dangerously, reproducing same­
ness even at the level of how we teach. In the last decade or so, critical and feminil\t educators have demonstrated 
the poverty of mainstream pedagogy, and have begun to develop alternative and better approaches. Again the dis· 
course of sameness and difference can help structure our understanding of these developments. Mainstream edu­
cation works on an assumption of sameness in that, procedurally, it tends to give all students the same amount of 
attention and effort and then penalizes those who cannot keep up with the l'IICe. Substantively, it tends to identify 
core areas which it then universalizes as "knowledge" and then expects all students respond to it similarly. If they 
do not, they are penalized once again. Critical and feminist pedagogy tend to valorize difference. Both encourage 
OeXI1>ility so as adjustments can be made to provide adequate attention and effort so that those who need as• 
sistance can also achieve the standards required. Education understood in this light is "learner centered" rather 
than "teacher centered." Furthermore, both critics and feminists recognize that the reason why some students do 
not deal well with knowledge is because that knowledge is not universal, it is not theirs, it is an alien social con­
struct. In response; critical or feminist teachelll attempt to develop courses, materials and techniques that dovetail 
more closely with the �ty and knowledge of these students. Teaching. then, is not undellltood as a top-down, 
unidirectional process but is transformed into an interactive conversation that exchanges and validates different 
knowledges. 
To bring these points into sharper relief, it may be helpful if we temporarily escape the confines of Euro-yanqui 
legal education and attempt to achieve some critical distance through a reflection on the work of one of the most 
influential practitioners and theorists of these alternative methods of teaching. Latin American educational 
theorist, Paulo Freire. Freire adumbrates two competing visions of the educational process which he variously 
labels as "banking" and "critical',' "domesticating" and "b1>erating." Their differences can be roughly schematized 
as follows : 
student as object 
student as depository 
student passive 
Critical 
student as subject 
student ai contributor 
student active 
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( d) Substantive Studies 
Given the important cultural differences that distinguish mainstream and in­
digenous understandings and approaches to the world, we must attempt to render 
the law school more sensitive to those alternative perspectives and practices. For 
example, in recognition of the centrality of the oral tradition� we should, perhaps, 
attempt to make our classes less text bound and lecture based and more con­
versational. Or, with regard to evaluation, we should contemplate the possibility 
of oral rather than written examinations, if that was the pref erred choice of the 
students. Or, at the minimum, we should devise mechanisms that would allow for 
ongoing evaluation throughout the term, rather than the 100% final exam. 
Alternatively, we could evaluate indigenous students on criteria other than those 
which are premised upon examinations, for example, their work in some 
volunteer agency. 86 
On the substantive level, we should strive to develop courses that directly en­
compass issues that will be of particular interest to Indigenous students. At UBC 
for example, there are four courses in "Native Law ": The Foundations of 
Aboriginal Rights and Treaties, Self Government, Land Claims and Comparative 
International Law. At the same time, however, we must be cautious not to ghet­
toize indigenous issues and should strive to develop "generative themes "87 in all 
teacher as dispenser 
knowledge as object 
education as hierarchal 
education as lecture 
education as domesticating 
education as oppression 
teacher as facilitator 
knowledge as process 
education as cooperative 
education as dialogue 
education as consciousness 
education as liberation. 
See Pedagogy of the Oppressed, supra note 60; Education /or Critical Consciousness (New York: Seabwy, 1973); 
The Politics of Education, supra, note 2. It is aho worth noting that Freire's suggestions for an alternative pedagogy 
overlap with and manifest themselves in the practice of Latin American Christian "base communities," one aspect 
of the praxis of h'beration theology. See Philip Benyman, Uberatwn Theology (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1987), at 63-79. 
Particularly useful discussions of feminist pedagogy can be found in Adrienne Rieb, "Toward a Woman­
centered University,'' in On lies, Secrels and Silence (New York: Norton, 1979); Elizabeth Langland and Walter 
Gove (eds) A Feminist Perspective in the Academy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Charlotte Bunch 
and Sandra Pollack, uoming Our Way (Trumansberg. N. Y.: C1'06Sing Press, 1983); Margo Culllcy and Catherine 
Portugues, Gendoed Subjects (Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); Kathleen Weiler, Women Teoching for 
Change (South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Gazvey, 1988); Symposium "Restructuring the Academy" (1987) 12 
Signs 203-372. 
Further, several helpful papers which focus on ways to improve the proces.ses of legal education can be 
found in J. Himmelstein and R Lesnick, Humanistic Educalion in Law Monograph III (St. Paul: West, 1981). 
�atricia Monture, "Ka-Nin-Goh-Heh-Gab-E-Sa-Nonb-Yab-Gab" (1986) 2 CJ.W.L 159. Sam Deloria, "Legal 
Education and Native People" (1973-74), Saskatchewan Law Review 22 at 29. 
�ecommendation 9a, Native Law Seminar, Dalhousie University, June 17 1988. 
87 Freire, supra, note 2. 
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our other classes. We should attempt to expand the horizons of traditional 
courses to include issues that relate to indigenous concerns or perhaps to draw on 
indigenous legal materials or documents. For example, in contracts we could dis­
cuss the contractual aspects of the refusal of the Nova Scotia government to 
honour the hunting rights of the Micmac nation as they are enshrined in treaties, 
treaties that have been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada. Again, we could 
inquire into the way in which both contracts and property law have, historically, 
tolerated and legitimized the practice of racial discrimination. Esmerelda Thorn­
hill has suggested that the Criminal Code be amended to create a crime of racism 
and that if any other crime involves a racist element then that should increase the 
relevant sanction, paralleling the distinction between assault and aggravated as­
sault.88 The pedagogical advantages engendered by such a discussion would have 
significance beyond the particular concerns of indigenous people. 
Furthermore, there is some indication that because of profound cultural and 
value differences, some courses prove to be particularly difficult for some in­
digenous students to come to terms with.� Some students may find property law, 
as it is currently taught, conceptually alien.90 Perhaps the course could be adapted 
to respond to their needs, or failing that, they should have the option either to 
avoid the course altogether as a component of their LLB, or to take it in an upper 
year when they have a more solid legal foundation. Even more generally, by anal­
ogy with part time programmes, indigenous students should have the option of 
completing their degree in four or more years, rather than the compulsory three. 
What all this suggests is that legal education should be tailored to suit their needs 
rather than that they be forced to adapt to our routines, because the preferential 
option priorizes ortho-praxis (right acting) rather than ortho-doxy (right doc­
trine).91 
VI. Sameness And Difference 
88 See supra, note 3. 
The direct struggle by ... poor and oppressed people must be 
matched . . .  by a struggle and resistance against ourselves, 
against the ingrained ideals of always having more, of always 
having to increase our influence. 
Johann Baptist Metz92 
�Why So Few?, supra, note 1 at 57. This is an important point in that not all indigenous people experience the 
same problems. There are important differences between the Indigenous Peoples that we sho\lld strive very bard 
to be sensitive to. We should attempt to avoid the insidious dynamic of stereotyping which reduces difference to 
sameness. 
90Leroy Little Bear, "Concept of Native Title" (1982) Canadian Legal Aid Bulletin. 99. Furthermore, in relation 
to the point of profound cultural and value differences, Leon Trakman has suggested to me that the competitive 
and rampantly individualistic nature of current legal education, may be at odds with indigenous conceptions of ed­
ucation, thereby further reinforcing the alienation of the law school experience. 
91Philip Berryman, supra, note 84 at 85. 
92Jobann Bapti.,t Metz, .The Emergent Churr:h (New York : Cr�road, 1981) at 12. 
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We must be careful, however, not to let this proposed agenda for a 
reconstruction of legal education take on its own dynamic. As I mentioned ear­
lier, and it bears reiterating, the touchstone should be the needs and desires of 
those who are disadvantaged, not our arrogant professorial predilections. We 
must be extremely careful to avoid the dangers of our liberal predecessors: as­
similation, integration, protectionism, paternalism, beneficent neo-imperialism 
and western intellectual. prejudice. Our concern should be to create spaces to al­
low for the emergence of authentically different voices within the academy, not 
ventriloquism.93 
Legal educators in the university encounter a disturbingly narrow cross sec­
tion of Canadian society, for the catchment area is structurally and racially exclu­
sive, thereby benefitting some and excluding others. The result, in the main, is the 
reproduction of "solipsistic tunnel vision,"94 an entrenchment of sameness, a 
marginalization of difference and an exclusion of otherness. Lest there be any 
doubt about what I am suggesting, let me be clear. An addiction to sameness is an 
addiction to oppr.ession. The remedy of a preferential option is qualitatively dif­
ferent from affirmative action ( although we can develop this as a deviationist 
base) for that runs too great a danger of either letting a few others in, but just 
enough to pacify our liberal consciences, or tokenism. Affirmative action leaves 
too much of the substantive and methodological foundations of liberalism intact,95 
calling only for tolerance, pluralism (add the minority and stir) and generosity 
when what is required is openness, renewal, transformation and conversion. My 
proposal is that we actively seek out and support to the best of our abilities large 
numbers of indigenous students, at least five per year per law schooi 96 for as the 
93..niere is a real danger of which I have attempted to be extremely conscious. This article certainly runs the risk of 
being paternalistic, arrogant or protectionist, a reinterpretation and encoding of a profound social problem from 
the perspective of one who does not know; an appropriative, intellectual, neo-imperialism dressed in a critical 
empathetic guise. Theft. It is this concern that underpins the caution of the title and the nondoctrinaire presenta­
tion of the reconstructive proposals. Substantively, as I have attempted to indicate, my aim is modest: to help gen­
erate a discussion and practice in the legal academy that, as yet, bas really not received sufficient attention; and to 
help create spaces in the academy so that those who will be affected most directly will have the opportunity to 
define what the problems are and what the appropriate remedies may entail. It may be a thin line between being 
part of the problem and part of the solution. See also note 51. 
94 Adrienne Rieb, ''Taking Women Students Seriously" in Gendoed Subjects, supra. note 84, 21 at 25. 
95For a particularly useful discussion of the structures and patterns of resistance to affirmative action programs in 
the United States see Carl A. Auerbach, ''The Silent Opposition of Professors and Graduate Students to Affirma­
tive Action Programs : 1969-1975" (1988) 72 Minnesota Law Review 1233. See also Anthony J. Scanlon, ''The His­
tory and Culture of Affirmative Action" (1988) Brigham Young L Rev. 343. The suggestion of this paper is that 
the only effective way to deal with such repressive resistance is to identify its premise of formal meritocracy, to un­
mask the hidden agenda of privilege in the ideology of merit, and to provide alternative political and moral foun­
dations for entitlement to community goods. 
� may not appear very dramatic or challenging to the status quo. However three points should be noted. If 
there are twenty one law schools in Canada, that would mean that in each academic year there would be CNer one 
hundred indigenous students, and in any given academic year fifteen students per law school I do think that is an 
important opening up of legal education. Moreover, each law school must also make arrangements to ensure that 
these students complete their degrees and, as I have indicated, that will require a fairly extensive use of limited 
resources. Secondly, the suggested number of five is provisional and a minimum, targeted at the immediate con­
text. Consequently, it is open to revision as more indigenoWl candidates apply to law school. Third, as I indicate 
elsewhere, indigenous people are not to be the only benefactors of the preferential option, and policies might be 
, 
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UBC experience tells us, difference can only have a home when there is peer sup­
port.97 Moreover, the Indigenous Peoples are not the only oppressed group within 
the Canadian polity. A similar option, although closely tailored to each group's 
specific needs, should also be developed for other communities who have been 
marginalized by the traditional legal culture. In this way, we can begin to 
decentre the politically sclerotic and elitist influences of one of the citadels of pri­
vate power, law schools, in order to democratize them and perhaps, to help create 
a liberated zone in which those who have been excluded and exploited can pursue 
cultural action for freedom.98 
VII. A Prospective Precedential Conclusion 
Futurology is an impossible enterprise. What is certain about 
the future is that it will bring surprises. 
Phillip Berryman91) 
By way of conclusion, I want to make a few comments on the past, present 
and future. As I suggested earlier, modernity is primarily future-oriented in that 
transience and a belief in the "not yet " are its underlying themes. Given this, one 
would have thought that contemporary education would welcome modernity as an 
ally in forging the future. However, this does not appear to be the case in that 
much of what we do, at least in the legal academy, is either retrospective or rein­
forcing of the status quo.100 Restated, legal academics are, in the main, 
antimodern clericists101 who lack a transgressive vision of the future. My sugges­
tion is that Canada's future lies with our diversities, with the Indigenous Peoples, 
minorities, women, the poor, people of colour, people with alternative sexual 
designed that would attract even greater numbers of non-mainstream students. In sum, even these relatively 
modest proposals might engender quite a different legal educational environment. Transformation is more realistic 
than revolution. 
Moreover, the radicalism of this proposal can be highlighted through a comparison with one proposed 
governmental strategy. Bromley Anmtrong, of the Ontario Labour Relations Board, recently informed the Mar­
shall InquiJy that the RCMP bas only 1 % minority participation but that it does have a goals and timetables target 
that over the next fifteen years it hopes to have minority representation to the extent of 3%!. 
97 See eg Puricb, supra, note 63 at 85-86 and 98. Monash bas gone even further in establishing and supporting 
aboriginal "enclayes" within the university in order to resist the impersonal and culturally alien educational institu­
tions, in order help provide a "sense of mutual identity, solidarity, support and obligation .. .  and community" 
MOSA supra, note 80 at 15. Another Australian, Bob Connell, bas also discussed the idea of liberated zones. See 
bis Gender and Power (Polity in Association with Blackwell, 1987). 
98F'reire, Politics of Educawn, supra, note 2 at 43. 
91)Uberalion Theology, supra, note 84 at 201. 
100For a useful scbematization and overview of the various political roles fulfilled by academics, see Stephen 
Brooks and Alain Gagnon, Social Scienlists and Politics in CONJda (Kingston: Mcgill--Queen's University Press, 
1988), "Introduction." 
101T.S. Eliot coined this term in a critique of the intellectual defenders of the status quo. See "On the Place and 
Function of the Clerisy" in The Idea of a Christian Society and Other Writings. (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 
1982) 159. 
1989] TOWARDS AN/O THER LEGAL EDUCA TION 117 
orientations etc. As legal educators we must make space for these people, we 
must critique, destabilize and eliminate the socially constructed barriers that fore­
close an egalitarian future for these people, barriers that are founded on 
caucasian ethnocentrism, male hegemony and compulsory heterosexuality.102 
Legal education, in this view, is in dire need of reconstruction in the pursuit of 
difference so as to exist for others, and not for the reproduction of sameness. 
Some may object to my tentative reconstructive proposal, that it is naive, 
idealistic or utopian, the desultory ruminations of a nameless and powerless aca­
demic in an ivory tower. The past and the present, however, suggest that they are 
mistaken, for precedent, to�, can be remade to support my reconstructive agenda. 
Nothing is sacred! As legally trained persons, many of us have an almost infantile 
need for the sanctifying grace of precedent . . . if it has not been done, it cannot 
or should not be done. I want to suggest to you that dramatic and fundamental 
changes can, and should, be effected in an institution as retrospective, ponderous, 
conservative and hierarichally remote as the legal community. Our omission to do 
so should only be interpreted as a refusal to do so, as a complicitious moment in 
Canada's long hisiory of self-imposed myopia, a will not to know. The failure of 
the legal academy to pursue the preferential option must then stand as monument 
to our choice to defend an alternative preferential option, one that is itself 
partisan to its core, for it favours the rich, the racially dominant and the 
privileged. 
Anyone with a sense of international affairs can hardly fail to be amazed with 
developments in the Soviet Union over the last four years or so. Under the 
leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviets have begun to attempt a major so­
cial reconstruction, captured in the neologisms of glasnost, perestroika, and khoz­
raschot. This reference is not intended to suggest that a reconstructed Soviet 
Union is exercising a preferential option for the poor or the oppressed, or that 
current developments are inspired by solidarity or care. Rather it is to suggest a 
more structural--or should I say reconstructive--point that reconstruction can be 
from the top down as well as from the bottom up, and that it can take place in 
even the most unlikely locations.103 
Another, perhaps surprising, example might also help. Historically, if there is 
any institution that can rival the Soviet Union for conservativism and resistance to 
change� or has a history of support for or encouragement of power elites, or has 
been complicitious in the preservation of unjust social structures, it is the Roman 
Catholic Church.104 Of particular significance is the role played by the Society of 
102Adrienne Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" (1980) 5 Signs 631. 
103For some useful and cautiously critical disc�ioos of Soviet reconstruction, see for example, Mikhail Gor­
bachev, Perestroika (New York: Harper and Row, 1987); Jerry Hough, &ssia and the West (New York Simon and 
Schuster, 1988); Ralph Miliband et al. eds. "Problems and Promise of Socialist Renewal" Socialist Register 1988.; 
Donald Kelley, Soviet Politics from Brezhnev to Gorbachev (New York : Praeger, 1987). Lawyers may find the fol­
lowing to be of particular interest: "Perestroika : A Joint Interview with Soviet Lawyers" (1988) 1 International 
Review of Contemporary Law, and Alexander Sukbarev, "The USSR:Some Legal Aspects of Restructuring" Inter­
national Review of Contemporary Law (forthcoming). 
104For a specific disc�ion of conquest, colonization and christianization in the context of Latin America see En­
rique D�� History of the Church in Lalin America (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981). 
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Jesus, the Jesuits, who have served as the intelligentsia of the church, fulfilled the 
role of the central defenders of the hierarchy and elitism of the pope, even to the 
extent of the inquisition. Much of the Church's conservative political agenda is re­
lated to the pre--and anti-modern premise that the very identity of catholicism is 
anchored in universalism and unchangeability. And yet both the Church and the 
Jesuits have, in the course of the last quarter century, been undergoing the throes 
of a major modernist transformation. Specifically, in response to the imperialism 
of capitalist and communist practices alike, the Catholic church has begun to 
respond to the existential, and not just the Sf iritual, needs of the Third World, 
with particular reference to Latin America.1 5 On an intellectual leve� this has 
manifested itself in liberation theology; on a practical level, it has resulted in the 
development of educational and health programs and an extremely active political 
agenda that is at once critical of the exploitative activities of the power elites-­
both local and imperialist--and passionately committed to social justice. The 
Jesuits have played a pivotal role in this transformation.106 Indeed, my adoption of 
the preferential option for the poor and the oppressed, as you may have already 
realized, is culled from these developments in Latin America, outside the 
mainstream of Euro-yanqui society.107 
But we do not need to look so far for inspirational examples of how things 
could be otherwise. There are examples internal to our legal system which, if 
105Some readers may be somewhat disturbed by this religious turn in my thinking, particularly given my left­
oriented dynamic and the Mancist aphorism that religion is "the opiate of the people." My response is twofold. 
First, like most of our cultural practices and institutions, I do not believe that religion is total in its repressive 
powers. Rather there are gaps, spaces, nuances, countertrends and loci of resistance. Progressive praxis needs to 
develop these, to operate from within as well as from without., priorizing neither one nor the other. Secondly, it 
may be possible to identify and develop emancipatory elements of religion in an eclectic sense without adopting 
theological idealism, with its potential for placatory deradicali1.ation. 
1�alachi Martin, The Jesuits (New York: Linden Press, Simon and Schuster, 1987). 
107Toe concept of a preferential option was first adopted by the Second General Conference of Latin American 
Bishops (CEIAM II) at Medellin, Colombia in 1968, and swvived a conservative reaction at CEIAM III in 
Peubla, Mexico, 1979. For a discussion see, Gustavo Gutierrez A Theology of Uberodon. trans; Renato Poblete, 
(Maryknoll, N.Y.: Ort>is Books, 1973), "From Medellin to Peubla" in Daniel Levine ed., Churches and Politics in 
LAiin America. (Beverly Hill: Sage Publications, 1980) at 41; Phillip Benyman, Uberodon Theology, supra, note 84 
at 42-44; Edward Cleary, Crisis and Change: The Church in LAiin America Today (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Ort>is Books, 
1985). 
Liberation 1beology bas also bad an impact on the Catholic Church in Canada. See for example, G.Baum 
and D. Cameron, Ethics and Economics: Canm:la's Catholic Bishops on the Economic Crisis (f oronto: Lorimor, 
1984) and W.E. Lewis and D.L Lewis, "Liberation Theology in First and Third World Countries" (1988) 30 Jour­
nal of Church and State 33. 
Liberation theology bas also been embraced and modified by, for example Blacks and feminists. See more 
generally, James Cone, A Block Theology of liberation (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970), For My People: Black 
Theology and the Block Church (Maryknoll, N. Y.: Ort>is Books, 1984) and Rosemary Radford Reuther, Sexism and 
God-Talk: Tuward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983); Carter Heyward et al. God's Fierce Whimsey: 
Chrish"an Feminism and Theological Education (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1985); Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, A 
Land Fluwing with Milk and Honey (New York: Crossroad, 1986) 
Moreover, we should not be too cynical about the possibility of dramatic change within religious oommunities, for 
even liberation theology bas a dramatic and powerful precedent the Protestant Reformation. 
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suitably and critically developed and expanded, can also provide us with some 
direction as to how we might proceed. For example, within legal education there 
has been an increasing awareness that merely providing students with the skills of 
a lawyer, "the cobwebs of technique, "108 is at best only an achievement of in­
strumental rationality. At worse, it has contributed to the impoverished, uncriti­
ca� unprofessional and not infrequently, morally culpable practices of lawyers. 
Consequently, in its best manifestations, there has been an effort to enable stu­
dents to think critically about their future roles as lawyers and the responsibilities 
to others that their professional status and skills entail.100 Indeed, three schools in 
Canada now have mandatory courses in professional responsibility. 110 My point is 
that we already have accepted in principle the idea that lawyers and legal educa­
tion must confront issues of social responsibility, m our next task is to expand the 
scope of that opportunity, to make societal responsibility and not elite reinforce­
ment the organizing paradigm of Canadian legal education.112 
Furthermore, the underlying idea of exercising a preferential option for the 
poor and oppressed has already been accepted by the Canadian polity, although 
perhaps inchoately, begrudgingly and equivocally. Section 15(2) of the Charter 
constitutionally.entrenches the possibility of remedial affirmative action. My sug­
gestion is that affirmative action is a cognate of the preferential option, although 
its potential is circumscribed by its embeddedness in liberal presuppositions and 
discourse. The preferential option, premised as it is on solidarity and care, may 
allow us to rework the idea of affirmative action, to help it transmute from a lib­
eral idea that is embedded in the pseudo-objectivity of individual merit and equal­
ity of opportunity, to a more communitarian social and political practice that 
aspires to group entitlement and equality of condition. Proposals for another 
legal education such as this are not designed to bury liberalism. Rather they are 
designed to unmask and transcend its limitations, by developing from within some 
of its contradictory tensions. A commitment to difference need not necessitate 
disjunction, merely a recognition of the inequality inherent in �ameness. 
Finally, to close on a guardedly optimistic note, I want to draw to your atten­
tion some recent developments within the Canadian Bar Association, a body not 
1�reire, The Politics of Education, supra, note 2 at 39. 
100Toe most helpful Canadian d.iscuMion of this topic is Alvin Esau,''Teaching Professional Ethics and Responsi­
bility at Law School" in R.Matas and D. McCawley, Legal Education in Canoda, supra, note 21 at 308. Particularly 
progressive American d.iscuMions include, David Luban ed., The Good Lawyer (fotowa, NJ.: Rowan and Allen­
held, 1983); T.L Shaffer and R.S. Redmount, Lawyers, Law Students and People (Colorado Sp�: Shepard's, 
1977). 
11°-rhey are Alberta, Dalhousie and Manitoba Prior to Dalhousie joining this group, Esau estimated that "less 
than twenty per cent of the total Canadian law school population enrolls in a course in professional responsibility" 
supra, note 109 at 336. 
lllThe emergence of legal aid also indirectly indi�tes that there is some awareness within the legal community of 
the phenomenon of social responsibility. 
ll2yet another precedent for dramatic change with reference to educational processes and structures can be found 
in Quebec during the post war years. As Brooks and Gagnon demonstrate educational reconstruction was a vital 
"subversive" component in the forging of the Quiet Revolution. Supra, note 100 Ch. 1 and 7. 
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renown for either its progressivism or its reconstructive visions. In a recent report 
entitled, "Locking Up Natives," the C.BA.'s Committee on Imprisonment and 
Release recommended the establishment of "alternative" and "parallel native jus­
tice systems ... designed to incorporate community values." Not only does the 
report recognize and advocate that the locus of legal authority must shift from the 
dominant culture to indigenous political structures, it also acknowledges that the 
relocation will give rise to substantive differences: "In an effort to develop a cul­
turally based system, native groups may propose correctional facilities very dif­
ferent from existing structures." Moreover, the report argues that the dominant 
culture must proactively encourage and support such differential initiatives in 
that, "priority should be given by governments in their allocation of criminal jus­
tice research funds to encourage the development of pilot projects of working 
models of contemporary native justice systems."113 Thus, it is only if difference is 
prioriz.ed that there can be any hope of equality and participation for those who 
are marginalized, victimized and oppressed on the basis of their race by the 
mainstream of contemporary Canadian culture. 
To close the circle and to return to the themes articulated by Harry Arthurs, 
I want to say that nothing in this paper is intended to be a claim to heroic status; 
it is neither Promethean nor Herculean. 1 14 When all is said and done, 
Prometheus is mythical, racism is a reality. The critique and tentative proposals 
that I have outlined are an attempt to confront the embedded racism--conscious 
or unconscious, intentional or unintentional, direct or systemic--of the legal acad­
emy, to create spaces within the legal community for those who have a perspec­
tive from the bottom up. My ambition is to help uncouple freedom and domina­
tion, to facilitate the decentring of the economy of sameness and to engender a 
juridical economy of difference. 
Postscript 
Occasionally, theory becomes practice. In the spring of 1989, Dalhousie Law 
School adopted a report incorporating some of these proposals and generated 
funding for two years. 
113supra, note 63. Swnmaiy of Recommendations at 9. In light of our heritage of oppression, it is aJso of sig­
nificance that the report makes substantial positive recommendations in relation to the importance of native 
spiritual expression and experience, particularly for prisoners. Ibid at 90-95. 
114As always, power is seductive. I have attempted in this paper to be both critical and constructive, yet at the 
same to the careful is not falling into the trap of Vanguardism, for as Marx tells us in his third thesis on Fuerbacb, 
"the educator ... needs education." 
SEMINAR DISCUSSION: DEVLIN 
Chair: Barry Cameron* 
Richard Devlin: What I did at the beginning of my first year course is to take the 
students through two models of education and acknowledge that law school is 
a professional school and that there may be two approaches to learning--one 
called instrumental learning and one called critical learning, and I suggest 
that at least in my class we are going to try and do both, but it pays for some 
of the students when you tell them at the beginning of the year where you are 
coming from and where you are going. I think that can be some sort of basis 
on which to start a conversation with your students. In relation to other de­
partments and other members of Faculty, I am not sure of how you go about 
starting the conversation even. We do talk different languages, some of my 
colleagues don't know what I am talking about, although I try to be as explicit 
as I can. Other ones do understand, and I do think that, at least within my 
law school, there is a little bit of movement, it just isn't far enough or fast 
enough. I suppose I should comment that students also resist doing this, and 
there is an ethos of consumerism that this is their umpteenth year of univer­
sity, they are ·paying for it and they want to get the rules. I think that we can 
deal with that and we have to recognize that as a legitimate perspective from 
the students. We shouldn't dismiss that and I think that some of the people I 
work with within Critical Legal Studies do dismiss that perspective. But I 
think that we can pitch it to the students to say that we are trying to give you 
an opportunity to do things better and you will be a better lawyer if you are a 
critical lawyer. You can serve your clients that much better if we are talking 
about being a practicing lawyer or if you are going to go into government, or 
whatever, you can do things with your critical knowledge as well. And so we 
can pitch it to them, but that's a political strategy also, how you sell your 
course to your students. 
Barbara Pepperdene (Sociology, UNB): What you're saying struck me as gener­
ally highlighting a paradox, a dilemma or at least a tension that is within all 
professions, particularly modern professions that are based in a body of 
knowledge both as a substance of what they do in the market and as a dis­
cipline. It struck me that this paradox, dilemma or tension exists both in law 
school and in practice and that is the dilemma in the acquisition of knowl­
edge which is empowering. The idea that when one acquires knowledge, one 
acquires that which empowers them to do things as opposed to that other 
side in professions, the appropriation of knowledge and it strikes me that the 
appropriation of knowledge is not empowering except for those in control ei­
ther of the knowledge base that decide what is the knowledge of the profes­
sion and/or those in charge of the means of developing and expressing that 
knowledge base. It strikes me this is the difference between the nineteenth 
century ideal of professions--which is entry by  examination--and 
credentialism, which tests whether one has satisfied somebody else's defmi­
tion of what knowledge is to be appropriated. 
0
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Devlin: I agree with the idea of tension and because it is tension we are in a good 
position. If it was a contradiction, then you are either/or. Because of the 
tension there is some hope at this point. That is why Critical Legal Studies is 
known for its critique, it is not known for its suggested alternatives. I want to 
start making some of the suggested alternatives. Not an awful lot of what I 
said here is original in a sense, I think it is drawing on several different ideas 
and perspectives and trying to give them some element of focus and to try to 
push the tension further and to see how far we can go with that push. So I 
like the idea of tension and that is my understanding as well. 
David Howes: I wonder about an older notion of justice, of justice as hard, not 
something that it is easy to love; in fact something that might seem terrible to 
have to put up with at first and then only being able to recognize its beauty 
afterwards, and this is Socratic inevitably. But what of that idea of justice as 
hard? 
Devlin: I don't think that. It is difficult to be in solidarity with your students, in 
other words you ,have to be in your office at times when you would rather be 
at home writing or reading or something else. But I don't want to be suggest­
ing that we necessarily have to go through a sort of masochistic stage to get 
to the next stage of things being better. I get a lot of pleasure from doing 
what I do, but I also work very long hours and that has other costs in my life. 
I'm not pedagogical in the personal, it is difficult on lots of different levels. 
Yes it is not easy. But I find I get an amazing response from some of my stu­
dents after a while, it does take a while but there are serious relationships 
that are built up. I have drawn on liberation theology here to a certain extent 
but that doesn't mean I subscribe to the religious opinions of that, and some­
time the Catholic need some sort of self--inflicted punishment somewhere 
along the way to feel . . .  I don't think we have to do that. 
Tom Condon (History, UNBSJ): I guess I was a bit overwhelmed by the range of 
the critical tour de force. I find myself assenting to some of the insights that 
you enunciated, saying maybe to others and having deeper questions about 
some. I guess I recognize that you are trying to concretize it in one area in 
terms of Indian education in the legal field and I guess I fmd myself dis­
appointed that it becomes kind of mechanistic, selected quotas, . . .  of faculty 
members' time to devote to counselling, pretty mechanical. It seems to me 
that the more difficult questions are not the kinds of how do you do this or 
that or how do you deal with some of it--evident critiques that you have ad­
vanced but how can you in the exam pie that you have chosen, really make 
some change, how can you not corrupt and co-opt in the process of trying to 
deal with the elements of your critique and maybe limit it to Indian educa­
tion. 
Devlin: I see sort of two questions there, the first being mechanical critique, the 
how to do it and the second one the danger of corruption and co-option. On 
the mechanical element of it, I did make a big jump into a very specific sug­
gestion. That was intentional. The critique of the crits is that they never tell 
us how to. Recognizing that at least a significant amount of the audience 
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here today would be lawyers, I wanted to say something about how to--so 
that is the reason why I have something as mechanical. I do suggest a quota 
of five to ten native students per year per school. At this point there may be 
something like fifteen per year in Canada. What I am trying to do is dramati­
cally expand the numbers. That would be a major jump, for example Dal­
housie this year took in three native law students. We failed with every other 
law student we have ever taken in, which is a major indictment of Dalhousie 
Law School and we know it. My suggestion is what do we have to do to make 
sure it doesn't happen to these same three students. So that is the how to. 
On the corruption/ co-option point, I am really worried about that. Law has 
this tendency for imperialism. It becomes hegemonic if you want to use neo­
Marxist terms and it tends to smother other processes that people get in­
volved in. We have to be really careful about that and not to give law too 
much leeway. However I do think it is up to the native people to decide 
whether they are being corrupted and co-opted, it is not up to us. The pur­
pose of this paper was to suggest that we create spaces for those people, they 
can make the choices. If I spend too much time worrying about corruption 
and co-option .and saying, well maybe this isn't the best approach for you to 
pursue your political agenda, your needs, your desires, that may end up as 
being paternalism once again. I am very worried about what you said and I 
am very conscious that we can't deny that law may have a detrimental impact 
upon these people. I am hoping if they develop as a critical mass, and that is 
only one example, I think there are lots of other examples of where we 
should do the same, . . . black people in Nova Scotia. Perhaps we can sort of 
cut back corrupting the co-opting influence. It is a political strategy, it is not 
a right answer. Does that answer your question? 
Steven Turner: Let me pursue what I think is a closely related question. I am un­
clear in my own mind about the relationship of your deviationist alternative 
for a law school to what we might call the strategies of empowerment that 
Harry Arthurs talked about last night. I f  I understood the strategy of 
empowerment, it was that disenfranchised groups are seeking to gain the 
tools which legal study provides in order to empower themselves, to turn the 
tools of the law against traditionally empowered groups. I suppose with 
respect to the vision that you set out this morning, I would like to ask you 
what do you see as the main purpose that we are trying to achieve in bringing 
native students into the law school. Is it to equip them with the tools to pur­
sue the strategy of empowerment perhaps beyond law school, or is it to pur­
sue a rather different vision that you very eloquently developed to give them 
the opportunity to create a new discourse within academia itself? I suppose 
at one level those two strategies might be compatible but perhaps not at the 
immediate level; it seems to me that they are very different and might be 
pursued in very different ways. Which do you see as foremost? 
Devlin: I know that to me thoughts about solidarity . . .  are most important in my 
life but I still want to create spaces that they can make the choice. If they 
want to pursue law in its traditional forms, that's their choice. I would prefer 
if they brought elements of their value structure to law. 
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Paolo Freire has a quote, this Latin American educational theorist, that 
says: In gaining knowledge and power, they also help liberate their oppres­
sors. I have some sense of some of the value structures that underpin native 
people and their communities. It would be nice if that could become part of 
our legal educational process. But that's not my agenda. All I want to do, 
and it is very modest in a sense, is just make some spaces. But what those 
spaces mean is that those who have privileges, those who are part of the elite, 
won't get those same opportunities that they used to have. It is a zero sum 
process. Some of the power elite will be at least moved out of that particular 
bastion or citadel. Again, I am just creating space, anything more might be 
dangerous. Can I ask a question, why have most of the participants so far 
been non--lawyers? Is there a reason for that? 
Yvette Michaud: I am a lawyer. You have made comments that liberalism has 
taken us a long way towards enhancing individual freedom maybe at the ex­
pense of the welfare of the community, and then you have given us one vision 
or one option that you think could empower one particular group. Have you 
addressed the question of how collectively something could be reconstructed 
maybe to counterbalance this excessive weight that you see us giving to indi­
viduals at the expense of the collectivity. Are there people starting to put op­
tions of reconstruction in that area? 
Devlin: One of the things that I am personally interested in is Jesse Jackson's 
idea of a rainbow coalition as a political strategy. And the idea behind a rain­
bow coalition is that groups of people who are different . . . will recognize 
their community in their differences and how that difference is their connect­
ing link. And that would be very much the underpinning of Jesse Jackson's 
political campaign. Tomorrow morning I am off to Washington to go to the 
Critical Legal Studies Conference, and one of our key speakers that we tried 
to get was Jesse Jackson. There is a sense that we have to look to each other 
and see what our differences are. And in that we can recognize both our in­
dividuality and our sense of community. 
Michaud: I guess I will try to be a little bit more precise. I guess what I was trying 
to find out is, are there some suggestions that you could make that could 
come from the top, like you are suggesting for natives that maybe this conser­
vative group that is the law school and the legal world could do something to 
change from the top. Is there something that, let's say judges, departments of 
justice, law schools, should be doing to try to instill a bit more of this care for 
community or the welfare of everybody? 
Devlin: You will get some students who really push their agenda and I try and 
have conversation with these students saying that your right to speak also has 
an element of responsibility, when you are responding to another student, 
you should try and think about the impact of what you say is on that other 
student. That gets real problems going in the class, I'm sometimes accused 
of being authoritarian because I suggest that you take into consideration the 
feelin� of other people. That immediately ends up in a free speech argu-
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ment. I actually end up getting quite good student evaluations but there 
tends to be some huge wars, sometimes in my office, sometimes in the cor­
ridor . . .  the accusation is I push my agenda too hard, my response is so does 
everyone of my colleagues. It's just the explicitness of our different agendas. 
Does that respond a little bit to your question? My suggestions--there isn't a 
master plan, we do a little bit here and there and maybe it will make things a 
little bit better for some people. If that is what we achieve, it is a start. 
Shauna McKenzie: Just to follow on with the debate which was started by Bar­
bara Pepperdene, I was always impressed when I went through law school 
that much of knowledge dealt with private law subject matter and individual 
property matters and then after that we are now dealing with the super­
imposed reconsideration of a broader scope of law . . . a wider base of con­
sidering individual needs which you are also bringing in as a basis of critical 
theory. But I have heard the backlash that we no longer can take it within 
the private system, private rights can only go to the Court of Appeal, for ex­
ample. The Supreme Court is now being taken over by these individual 
rights of the (;harter but that other body of law is now being displaced, and 
it's our first area of major concern, for individualism was through that consid­
eration of private rights. I dealt with the Bar Admission course, young stu­
dents coming from law school. They were so much caught up in wondering 
how they can practice · their material without still really appreciating where 
they are going to go with the understanding of some of their own values. 
They see the Charter as perhaps another area of defining interest but they 
won't see it so much in their private practice. They don't see that it is going to 
be able to go through the court because it is too expensive and so the whole 
thing becomes just another issue, another matter that never really reaches a 
new deeper understanding in consciousness. I guess my question is again 
dealing with mechanics, co-option, you say. I still feel there are so many 
thoughts and languages that are being used to understand what we are trying 
to cope with in dealing with a greater sense of community, but the law school 
itself is still slotted with different bodies of knowledge. I feel that your sense 
of critique is not a knowledge, it is perhaps a new understanding of values, 
but I just don't know how the two are ever going to become merged as 
relevant and integrated. I find that our sense of liberalism gave us a new 
sense of security with our knowledge, the Charter has superimposed and cre­
ated tension that is perhaps resented, and I am wondering how you start to 
see, when you talk about your politics or your theory of care, whether that 
too will just be superimposed and we won't be able to see how it integrates 
through all areas of appropriatjon of knowledge. 
Devlin: For example I teach Contract Law and I set Contract Law up in an artifi­
cial sense of trying to resolve the tension between the individual and the com­
munity and I teach things like fairness/unconscionability as one end of that 
spectrum and more formalistic ideas within contracts at another end of the 
spectrum. 
McKenzie: I think your discussion was talking about a kind of social revolution. I 
don't know what the reaction has been generally to what the Charter of Rights 
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was intended to be or where it would take us as perhaps a guide or reinforce­
ment of thoughts. Many of us are saying it is a reinforcement of some social 
values that we do have in our society, but many of us are saying that it now 
has to continue to challenge so many of the norms and so many of the norms 
are now having backlash factors and repercussions. We have heard the com­
ment last night, maybe if it is in the wrong hands or the wrong people we will 
have a law that will become a much more distorted forum, and so you 
wonder where to take it. 
Devlin: The main beneficiaries of s. 15 have been men. There is always the 
danger of disconnection, I think. You've got to plan, you think that if we go 
that way it might work. You have only got limited power, though, and some­
body else might come along and redirect your whole enterprise. It is a real 
danger. The alternative is, don't do anything. We are lawyers, I don't think 
we should give up on law. I'm not a legal fetishist by any means and I agree 
with President Arthurs last night that law will not solve a lot of our problems, 
but I don't think we should give up either. There is a feminist critique called 
Dancing Through .the Mine Field and that is what you are doing, and I like the 
idea of dancing in a sense. At least it's got some life in it. And that is what 
I'm trying to do. Yes, there are real dangers here and I believe in other 
things beyond law . . . but we also are lawyers. I don't think we should 
divorce the political and personal or professional and personal. We should 
do a little bit of both. 
